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May we someday find a balance that allows us to live in harmony with the world around us.
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Motivation_____________________________________
My motivation for writing such a unique paper that combines academic theories in
economics, government, and sociology is not simple to explain, as it comes from many years of
growth and exposure to so many different people and ideas. In my research I have found that
grass roots environmental activism, although necessary, is a lot of work for little guaranteed
return because the environmentally friendly solutions proposed are often more expensive than
the current policy. There is also a dilemma between the present and future urgency surrounding
issues that involve global public goods, particularly about the idea of climate change. I invite the
reader to explore my thought process, which has ultimately driven me to research and write
about a pragmatic way to find solutions for environmentalists and non-environmentalists with
regard to energy.
Harnessing energy and using it efficiently is the key to the growth of economies, which
promotes improvements of general welfare and quality of life. Human beings ever increasing
stock of knowledge that enables improvements in general welfare is correlated with our initial
ability and thereafter increasing efficiencies of harnessing energy. Most of the energy generated
and harnessed to produce goods in modern society is provided by the burning of fossil fuels.
Whether it is wood, coal, oil, or natural gas, these fossil fuels are dirty, meaning they release
harmful emissions into the atmosphere when burned, such as nitrous oxide (NO), carbon
dioxide (CO2), and sulfur dioxide (SO2), etc. These energy carrying resources are attractive
because they are readily available commodities and have become the standard raw materials for
energy production in many developed countries. Not only do these resources pollute our
atmosphere and come with many hidden transaction costs, they are also finite, or ‘scarce’ in
economic terms. There will come a day when we will run out of the juice that makes our modern

industrial society flow. With mounting costs of purchasing these scarce, increasingly demanded
resources and an unknown date of when they will no longer be cheaply available for our use,
developed societies are beginning to face pressures to find alternative forms and resources for
energy production (See Appendixes).
Many renewable, non-fossil fuel based energy technologies have encountered troubles
entering the mass market against fossil fuel based technologies and will continue to face high
entry barriers due to an uneven playing field. The commercialization of these technologies has
been gaining much popularity as of late. The popularity is largely due to recent spikes in the
price of oil and natural gas, caused by a rapid increase in demand by developing behemoths
China and India, volatile distribution networks recently exposed by natural disasters, and the
prospect of terrorists disrupting pipelines, power plants, and refineries. Not only has the
immediate price per barrel of oil risen dramatically in recent years, the indirect costs of
obtaining, securing, shipping, and burning fossil fuels are also increasing. For example, going to
war to secure oil fields costs billions of dollars, the cost of shipping millions of fossil fuels is
rising, and old, inefficient centralized power-plants are costly to maintain past their peak. The
current energy creation and distribution network is an extremely risky, inefficient, and nondiversified way to power industrialized nations. New technologies that have the potential to
satisfy an increasing demand for energy and ultimately replace centralized energy must become
competitively priced on the mass market before we find ourselves in an economic growth
inhibiting energy crunch. I refrain from solely discussing the negative risks, externalities, and
consequences about current energy systems in developed nations, as this would not be a
pragmatic way to convince the world to stop utilizing highly centralized energy and fossil fuels.
Instead I provide a model that explains how clean, decentralized alternatives that seem costly
could be economically viable if producer’s marginal costs accurately reflected total costs endured

by society as a result of externalities. In light of the potential probability of these dire negative
consequences—such as global energy shortages, drastically rising energy costs, super-storms and
flooding caused by global warming—there is promising evidence for a brighter future.
The wheels of capitalism are slowly turning in the early and inevitable stages of creative
destruction. Green energy technologies are rising up against many market barriers created by
outdated energy institutions, taking significant steps in the beginning of the transition to a
decentralized and renewable energy-based economy. However, larger steps may be necessary to
foster economic sustainability and growth through the transition process. Ultimately, when a
vital resource, such as oil, becomes so scarce that the cost of using it is too high (the choke
price) substitute resources will begin to be more readily used and, if economical, may replace the
scarce resource. If this transition to the new resource is smoothly completed, economies will not
suffer much during transition and will potentially benefit after equilibrium has ultimately been
reached. Scarce fossil fuel utilization should inevitably be replaced by alternative renewable forms
of energy due to market induced forces when the price of fossil fuels increases past the choke
price. The smooth transition is the key to global economic sustainability and growth. Once the
choke price is met a free capitalist market will clear by itself. Current market distortions such as
taxes and subsidies that restrict free markets threaten the future of our society with market
failure. These constrictions are the government’s attempts to correct for poorly defined property
rights for public goods. Poorly defined property rights are the inherent flaw in the markets
themselves that consequently give capitalism incentives to negatively exploit natural capital. The
irresponsibly inefficient misuse of natural capital is threatening future economic sustainability.
The questions this thesis ultimately tackles are: What is wrong with the incentive
structure laid out by government allowing capitalism to threaten future economic sustainability?
Does the capitalist mechanism have what it takes for a smooth transition to decentralized

renewable technologies, or are market distortions too strong to allow this change to happen
within a reasonable time frame, or at all? What should be done to fix this problem that is
threatening future economic sustainability? The answers to these questions are as much
economic as they are political. Meeting the energy consumption demands of tomorrow presents
us with questions about where best to change policy today. These policies must provide
economic incentives that will foster increased energy creation and distribution efficiency in the
United States. This must happen before economic growth is hindered by a possible energy
crunch (See Appendixes). This debate is between what the government’s current stance on
energy is and what should be their stance based on the model outline in this thesis. The current
stance perpetuates dirty and inefficient centralized energy creation and distribution through
subsidies and poorly defined property rights that allow for irresponsible natural capital
exploitation. Alternatively, the creation of market incentive schemes that promote clean,
efficient, decentralized (distributed) energy distribution would address the collective action
problem surrounding property rights for public goods at a legislative level and encourage
economic growth. The model outlined in this thesis suggests that the latter would improve
societal welfare by enabling larger and more sustainable growth for developed economies.
Motivated by my inner passion for the widespread use and promotion of clean, efficient
energy production for the sheer environmental benefit, I assess rising energy costs due to supply
capacity being outpaced by demand and analyze political barriers that are distorting the energy
market. I apply this analysis through a theoretical model that supports a change in policy by redefining of property rights for public goods to correct inherent flaws in the market, creating the
incentives necessary for more efficient decentralized energy production to supersede inefficient
centralized energy production.

A transition from a centralized fossil fuel based global economy to a decentralized and
renewable energy based economy presents the world with perhaps the most difficult task ever
faced within human control. It is undoubtedly, in my opinion, up to the larger, more developed
states to manage this transition and assure its ease, as they are the major culprits in the misuse of
resources and energy. Perhaps it is up to the state with the biggest demand for fossil fuels to take
the lead, using its economic hegemonic abilities to steer the rest of the world through these
difficult evolutionary times. The United States, being the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels,
in my opinion, should take the wheel as early as possible making certain steps to see that the
transition is done as quickly and painlessly as possible. For this reason, this thesis will focus on
the energy institutions in the United States. It has become increasingly apparent, however, that
due to the political shortsighted nature of democratic governance that create market distortions,
current inefficient energy institutions are perpetuating beyond where free market forces say they
should. Shortsighted political figures speak for layman citizens who aren’t overly concerned with
issues such as global warming, urban smog, acid rain, and clean air and water scarcity because
the effects of these negative externalities are long term and difficult to accurately quantify.
Meanwhile the costs of these environmental problems are being incurred by the unwise citizen
who does not have the luxury of voting for the green candidate who doesn’t promise job growth
in his or her campaign. These costs also affect future parties, who are unable to vote, because
they will bear the cost of long term problems. This vicious cycle may ultimately cause markets to
fail, placing economies in dire risk of collapse.
Douglas North notes that,
This human environment is divided by social scientists into discrete disciplineseconomic, political science, sociology-but the constructions of the human mind
that we require to make sense out of the human environment do not coincide
with these artificial categories. Our analytical frameworks must integrate insights
derived from these artificially separate disciplines if we are to understand the
process of change. (North, 2005)

Therefore, as believer in free market capitalism while maintaining awareness for the environment
and sustainability, I believe that the most pragmatic way to achieve what many environmental
activists hope to achieve is to explore some of the things that publicly elected political figures
can grasp and promote on the campaign trail. These include economic growth, job creation, and
sustainability. In short, this thesis is not limited to economics because the world we live in is
both political and economic. Therefore, this paper on the political economy of energy takes a
unique look through the lens of new institutional economics on how capitalism, based around
poor incentive structures, is limited in the United States, possibly allowing for markets not to
clear at the choke price for centralized energy. I conclude with thoughts on the role government
should play in resolving this potential problem in order to allow for change in the way of job
creation, economic growth, and future sustainability.
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Preface

Preface________________________________________
We use energy in every facet of our lives. Energy enables the bonds that hold us together
and is the force that can break those same bonds apart. Energy allows human beings to do work
and we work to improve our individual and societal quality of life. Therefore, facilitating more
efficient means of producing and consuming energy will improve societal welfare and quality of
life by encouraging economic growth and improving the condition of our surrounding
environment. Modern economies function around institutions which generate and supply
energy. These institutions can enable economic growth and can also consequently constrict
growth. The centralized energy institution in the United States has become a distributional coalition, due to the
government’s attempts to create stability through stiff regulation based on ill-defined property rights, and is
hindering the capitalist market from destroying the old inefficient energy institution in order to create newer, more
efficient decentralized energy institutions. As stated in the title, this thesis attempts to show how
institutional change in the energy industry can improve societal welfare through democratic free
market capitalist mechanisms.
More specifically, this thesis will explore capitalism’s limited ability to destroy inefficient
distributional coalitions and create new, more efficient institutions in the energy market. The
legal incentive structures created for organizations to exploit in the energy industry will be
examined through the lens of new institutionalist and collective action theories. These incentive
structures are derived from ill-defined property rights, which have allowed for polities to erect
poor incentive matrices, thus allowing for centralized energy to become and remain the
predominant energy provider in the United States. I’ve chosen to use new institutional
economics as the underlying theory for economic change because of the recognition it gives to,
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what Oliver Williamson refers to as, limited cognitive competence or bounded rationality.1 A
primary argument of this thesis, as will become more apparent in following chapters, is that
institutions are man made constructs that are often created based on imperfect information due
to our limited cognitive competence about property rights. As North indicates,
The key to understanding the process of economic change is the intentionality of
the players enacting institutional change and their comprehension of the issues.
Throughout history and in the present world economic growth has been episodic
because either the players’ intentions have not been societal well-being or the
players’ comprehension of the issues has been so imperfect that the
consequences have deviated radically from intention. (North 2005)
Due to human beings’ limited cognitive competence or miscomprehension of the issues,
intentions of human actors may have put us on an unsustainable growth track. Many of the
public goods throughout our society, such as clean air, clean water, and biological diversity,
haven’t been properly protected against infringement, and thus, firms have been able to exploit
these goods belonging to the people to produce energy by inefficiently utilizing dirty fossil fuels.
The negative externalities caused by this unsustainable system are costing society an innumerable
sum of money, threatening societal welfare. These issues are becoming commonly accepted
knowledge but in order for societal welfare to improve, polities must address the issue of
property rights of public goods at the legislative level.
In Part I, beginning with Chapter One, I provide a basic framework for institutions and
include some insight on institutional change, utilizing theories by North, Williamson, and Olson.
Progressing into Chapter Two, I focus on the growth of economies because its importance to
societal wellbeing underlies the major analysis of this thesis. The focus of these first two
chapters emphasizes the importance that institutional change has on growth in the United States.
However, this same theory may be applied to other developed economies as well.
1

Among the three primary scholars in the new institutionalism economics field – Oliver Williamson, Ronald
Coase, and Douglas North – North’s theory for institutions and institutional change is the most structurally
outlined and will therefore serve as the primary theory for this thesis.
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Part II begins with Chapter Three, where I will take the theoretical framework laid out in
Chapter One and use it to analyze the formal and informal constraints, benefits, problems, and
limitations of centralized electricity institutions. It is in this chapter where I argue that
centralized energy has become a distributional coalition, a term that is explained in Chapter One.
In Chapter Four I take a similar approach as the preceding chapter, discussing the emerging
types of decentralized energy technologies, the institution of decentralized energy, benefits,
problems, limitations, and barriers to market entry. I conclude Chapter Four by comparing and
contrasting centralized energy with potential decentralized energy institutions that may arise as a
result of change.
In Part III, beginning with Chapter Five, I examine institutional change in the energy
industry in terms of the theory discussed in Chapter Two. I initially explore the limitations of
free market capitalism, answering the question about its creative and destructive abilities by
discussing issues about the uneven playing field and implications for fixing it. Despite high
market entry barriers there are areas where capitalism is helping decentralized energy
technologies to stay in the game but more help is necessary for a smooth transition. Following
this, I detail and explain how promoting institutional change from centralized to decentralized
energy could potentially allow for large-scale growth in the US and the world economy without
much threat of instability. Concluding the paper with Chapter Six, I provide thoughts on policy
options that would allow for institutional change. I will revisit the issue of the “un-free” market,
questioning the government’s role in maintaining stability and enforcing redefined property
rights, as well as its effort to rid the economy of stagnation. Based on the conclusion I have
drawn from the theoretical model, I suggest that the rules of the game need to be restructured in
order to improve societal wellbeing. Specifically, I propose an amendment to the United State’s
Constitution that would give recognition and assign title to public goods such as clean air and
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water. The amendment would call for the creation of a government backed organization to
represent and defend the citizen’s right to these properties in a court of law, thus solving the
collective action problem surrounding public goods. Lastly, I acknowledge some of the limits to
the model and suggest more realistic solutions to the problems at hand that also meet the criteria
that the model calls for.

iv

PART I

THEORY

1

Part I Introduction

Introduction____________________________________
Over the past twenty or so years, one of the more controversial topics in economics has
been the emergence of new institutional economics, or a “developing sociological view of
institutions.”i Simply put, “institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday
life.”ii It is through the lens of new institutional economics theory that centralized and
decentralized energy institutions are analyzed in subsequent chapters. However, before this
analysis can be conducted the reader should understand a theory of institutions and institutional
change. Institutional economist Douglass C. North provides an outline for a theory of
institutions and their effects on the performance of economies. This particular theory of the new
institutional economics gives recognition to human beings’ limited cognitive competenceiii,
which because of ill-defined property rights has led to the creation of inefficient and harmful
institutions through poor policy incentive structures, making it an optimal base theory for this
study. In order to make North’s theory more substantial, I turn to the theory of Mancur Olson
to fill in some holes in the underlying theory. His theory on the collective action of rent seeking
organizations is important to this study because it provides detailed explanations and
implications for distributional coalitions that arise in older, more developed societies, which
cause an overall decline in societal welfare. Chapter One outlines the Institutional Framework,
Degree of Competition and Incentive Structures for Beneficial Institutional Evolution, and
explains the Existence of ‘Distributional Coalitions’ in the Economy.
The subject of Chapter Two, The Growth of Economies, is vital to increasing the overall
welfare of humanity. Although economic growth is essential in all societies for the betterment of
mankind, it should be clarified that this chapter will reflect on the growth of already developed
capitalist economies. Developing economies are different, in terms of governance and growth
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potential, because their respective property rights structure is often not as established as in many
developed economies. Therefore, the formal constraints distinctive to each country may not be
mature enough to sustain long-term economic growth, thus limiting our ability to broadly
generalize and discuss all developing economies. Chapter Two asks ‘what is capitalism?’
identifying the mechanism that is alleged to weed out inefficiencies in the market. This leads into
the next section on The Free and Not So Free Market, which discusses the property rights and
free flowing aspects that markets require to foster a healthy capitalist society. The next sections
introduce the types of technologies responsible for large-scale and incremental economic growth
and the adaptive efficiency of institutions that allow for these types of growth to occur. Finally
this chapter concludes with a section on Stability, which raises the issue of how governments
should not give priority to short term stability over long term sustainability because it may risk
an ultimate decline in overall societal welfare.

i

New Institutionalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_institutionalism (04/10/06)
North, Douglas C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge UP, 1990. P 3
iii
Williamson, Oliver E. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” Journal of
Economic Literature Vol XXXVIII (September 2000): 595-613.
ii
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Institutional Theory

1___________________________________________
Institutional Theory
The evolution of institutions that create an hospitable environment for
cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth.
(Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Growth)

The reader might ask if the primary focus of this essay is to discuss economic growth
potentials, what significance does institutional theory have? North would answer this question
best, indicating that, “institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the
cost of exchange and production. Together with the technology employed, they determine the
transaction and transformation (production) costs that make up total costs.”iv Without
institutions, transaction and production costs would be too high for the economy to function.
Although institutions are diverse in different places, the evolution of these institutions allows for
the total cost of transactions to decrease on the condition that the environment promotes
cooperative solutions to exchanges, thereby allowing stable economic growth.
The natural tendency of human beings is to maintain control and stability – this provides
a basis for why institutions arise. North indicates that the, “major role of institutions in a society
is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human
interaction.”v It is important to note what North is saying in this last statement—that stability is
the primary objective over efficiency signifies that existing institutions may not be healthy for
their society in the long run, but their stability allows them to perpetuate for the sake of their
continual and reliable existence. Based on their perceptions of the world, human’s construct
institutional frameworks made up of formal and informal constraints. Organizations arise within
these constraints, acting as either players or officials of the game. The players interact with each
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other and with the officials, and the degree of their interaction is based on the incentives to
engage in contractual relationships. Through monitoring systems, officials ensure the game is
played fairly by punishing agents for breaking the rules, whether they encroach on property
rights and / or break contracts. Institutional change can be good for the economy because
surrounding environments are forever changing. Therefore, it is in the interest of the economy
for its institutions to adapt in order to increase efficiencies. Institutions change both
incrementally and drastically, the latter occurring less often. The ability of an economy to exhibit
prolonged sustainability is based on the level of competition and incentive structures for
beneficial evolution. However, stagnant economies are often the victim of distributional
coalitions, which inhibit institutional change. The following sections explore these ideas in
further detail.

Institutional Framework
North begins his theory by indicating that institutions are human constructs created to
reduce uncertainty and that institutions differ from society to society. The simplest definition he
provides is, “institutions include any form of constraints that human beings devise to shape
human interaction.”vi The constraints he refers to are either formal, such as rules and laws, or
informal, such as social norms, taboos, and even technologies.
Formal constraints “include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts.”vii
This particular type of constraint derives from a society’s need to enforce property rights.
The rules descend from polities to property rights to individual contracts.
Contracts will reflect the incentive-disincentive structure imbedded in the
property rights structure (and the enforcement characteristics); thus the
opportunity set of the players and the forms of organization they devise in
specific contracts will be derived from the property rights structure.viii
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The structure of formal constraints is what allows a society to establish itself and grow within a
virtual structure, while at the same time confining it from acting in divergence with the rules, by
allowing specific kinds of interaction and exchange. This tells us that supposed free societies,
such as the United States, are not entirely free… in fact they are very restrictive of freedom in its
literal sense. The ability to act within a system of formal constraints is often called freedom,
despite the literal meaning of the word.
As indicated earlier, North repeats that “…it is important to stress that there is nothing
in [this] argument so far about rules that implies efficiency… rules are, at least in good part,
devised in the interests of private wellbeing rather than social well-being.”ix Societies that allow
for the due process of reform to their structure of formal rules should be considered more
efficient, performing more towards the interest of societal wellbeing.
Informal constraints are equally as important as formal constraints but are much more
difficult to describe. Quoting Robert Sugden, North answers his question about the emergence
of such constraints. “A pervasive but relatively simple to explain form of such constraints is
conventions that solve coordination problems: ‘These are rules that have never been consciously
designed and that is in everyone’s interest to keep’ (Sugden, 1986, p. 54).”x North explains that it
is much easier to describe and be precise about formal rules than to describe and be precise
about the structure of human interaction within a particular society. Although they originate
from cultural traditions and taboos, informal constraints are very prevalent in the decision
making process of individuals, making their presence ubiquitous throughout modern economies.
After all, traditions are responsible for shaping the tastes and preferences of the consumer,
which determine the opportunity sets in an economy. The ultimate choice sets are a reaction to
the way the mind processes information—its limited cognitive competence.
The way by which the mind processes information not only is the basis for the
existence of institutions, but is a key to understanding the way informal
6
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constraints play an important role in the makeup of the choice set both in the
short-run and in the long-run evolution of societies.xi
The short and long-run evolution of institutions, North alludes, is determined in large
part by the opportunity sets derived by the mental processes involved in shaping a
society’s informal constraints.2
Informal constraints both subtly and visibly exist all throughout our societies. With three
encompassing thoughts, North says,
[e]ven the most casual introspection suggests the pervasiveness of informal
constraints. Arising to coordinate repeated human interaction, they are (1)
extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, (2) socially
sanctioned norms of behavior, and (3) internally enforced standards of conduct.xii
Cognizant, we are, that informal constraints often originate from cultural traditions we should
keep in mind that they will not drastically change over night. Instead they will evolve with time.
As North explains,
…we do know that cultural traits have tenacious survival ability and that the
most cultural changes are incremental… Equally important is the fact that the
informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately in
reaction to changes in the formal rules. As a result the tension between altered
formal rules and the persisting informal constraints produces outcomes that have
important implications for the way economies change…xiii
If, however, an informal constraint were to be technologically derived as opposed to culturally
derived, the constraint may be more easily alterable if a more efficient alternative were to
displace the outdated constraint. This would also have important implications for the way the
economy changed and will be explained further in forthcoming chapters.
Within institutions there exists a framework of organizations. Organizations “…are groups
of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives.”xiv These “organizations”
are entities that function as either players or officials. There are various different types of

2

Although this paper does not discuss the cognitive processes involved in human decision making, it would be
most prudent for the reader to read North’s more recent book, Understanding the Process of Economic Change.
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organizations that emerge within different institutional structures because not all groups of
individuals will have the same common objectives.
A crucial distinction… is made between institutions and organizations…
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players.
The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the
objective of the team within that set of rules is to win the game…xv
Depending on what “game” an organization is playing, there will be different rules as well as
objectives. The varied objectives of organizations range from the maintaining of stability and
promotion of societal growth, as governments often do, to earn a profit, as companies often do,
or to maximize utility, as consumer often do. It should be noted that the officials (the
government) are the ones who write the rules to the game, but it is only “in rare cases [that] the
government designs and enforces a set of rules of the game that encourage productive
activity.”xvi Due to the fact that the officials write the rules while the players play the game, “the
government has strong incentives to behave opportunistically to maximize the rents of those
with access to the government decision-making process… the government will [thus] cartelize
economic activity in favor of politically influential parties.”xvii The reader should note this for the
coming section about distributional coalitions.
The players and officials within organizations coexist and grow together sometimes
changing the institutional structure, depending on the overall level of interaction. North notes that
“both what organizations come into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced
by the institutional framework. In turn they influence how the institutional framework
evolves.”xviii Here we have a lead into how institutions change. Following this, he comments on
how economies are influenced by institutions. Institutions have the ability to affect the
performance of the economy because they determine the costs of exchange and production. As
uncertainty is reduced through the structure of constraints, production and transaction costs are
both reduced, improving the efficiency of the economy. North rhetorically ponders that “the
8
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central puzzle to human history is to account for the widely divergent paths of historical change.
How have societies diverged? What accounts for their widely disparate performance
characteristics?”xix Societies have diverged and have boasted different performance
characteristics because of the different levels of interaction between organizations and
institutions.
Institutions have punishments for violations of their society’s respective formal and
informal constraints. North indicates that “an essential part of the functioning of institutions is
the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishments.”xx Once violations can
be easily ascertained, the society’s effectiveness of monitoring the playing field for future violations
is a good gauge of how well the institution is functioning. As noted in North’s book, most
economic theories take enforcement as a given, however, enforcement should not be taken as a
given. As can be imagined, however, gauging enforcement is difficult from society to society.
What one must observe is the performance of contracts between patrons, which will indicate the
level of transaction costs. The spectrum of performance ranges from inefficient to efficient. The
transaction costs correlate directly from the former being most costly to the latter being least
costly. The most efficient contracts are self-enforcing. “Contracts are self-enforcing when it pays
the parties to live up to them—that is, in terms of the costliness of measuring and enforcing
agreements, the benefits of living up to contracts will exceed the costs.”xxi A primary goal of
economies is to achieve self-enforcing contracts.

Degree of Competition and Incentive Structures for
Beneficial Institutional Evolution
North goes on to state that institutional change is very complicated in nature, therefore it
is difficult to explain. Institutional change can come about from a variety of different reasons,
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such as a change in formal rules, informal constraints, or in kinds of effective enforcement, but
changes are rarely large and most typically occur at the margin. Change generally occurs
incrementally because bureaucracies act as preventative forces for the rapid change of formal
constraints. Even if formal constraints are changed, it is even more difficult and timely to change
the informal constraints of a society because they are most often rooted in cultural traditions and
societal norms. Although change is often slow, it does in fact occur. The direction which the
change takes place, for better or worse, depends on the type of interaction the organizations
share with the institution. The level of efficiency, if efficiency means that the common goal is
overall societal benefit, determines the direction of change. If institutional change improves
societal welfare via a reduction in total costs and better products, then the institution itself is
efficient.
North questions, “what accounts for societies experiencing long-run stagnation or an
absolute decline in economic well-being?”xxii Inefficient institutions are the cause, crippling the
abilities of societies to become more efficient. The more pertinent question is why do they
persist? He says that “…it is possible to explain the existence of inefficient institutions...” but it
is difficult in explaining why the competitive pressures will not “lead to their elimination.”xxiii In
attempting to explain the situation North writes that,
The answer hinges on the difference between institutions and organizations and
the interaction between them that shapes the direction of institutional change.
Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory,
determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take
advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the
institutions.xxiv
Therefore, the level of efficiency depends on the level of competition amongst the organizations
and the incentive structure for beneficial evolution, which is laid out by the institutional
framework. North then describes two assumptions by which the direction of change is shaped:
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The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by (1) the lock-in that comes
from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that
have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those
institutions and (2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive and
react to changes in the opportunity set.xxv
The symbiotic relationship referred to in the first assumption are the constraints that inhibit
change, while the opportunity set referred to in the second assumption is the “entrepreneurs”
perception of the idea of a less costly means for interaction versus the current system. This
‘perception’ is again what Williamson refers to as the limited cognitive competence, or bounded
rationality. In North’s words, “[incremental] change comes from the perceptions of the
entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the
existing institutional framework at some margin.”xxvi Finally, North explains that once an
institution becomes inefficient, it is difficult to realize alternative opportunity sets because actors
must base decisions on incomplete information that stems from the inefficient institution. Not
only do the players have this limited cognitive competence but it also limits the referees of the
game who define the rules. Therefore, the rationality behind the definition of property rights
remains bound by individuals’ perception of what they should be, not necessarily what they
really are.

Existence of ‘Distributional Coalitions’ in the Economy
North’s difficulty in explaining institutional change leads us to question why inefficient
institutions exist and harm the overall welfare of society. Mancur Olson explains that in
developed societies, as organizations and institutions evolve together, the organizations will
grow large enough to steer institutional change for the purpose of perpetuating their own
existence.
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The organizations for collective action within societies that we are considering
are therefore overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution of
income and wealth rather than to the production of additional output—they are
‘distributional coalitions’ (or organizations that engage in what, in one valuable
line of literature, is called ‘rent seeking’).xxvii
These distributional coalitions are harmful to society and,
…have the incentive and often also the power to prevent changes that would
deprive them of their enlarged share of the social output. To borrow an
evocative phrase from Marx, there is an “internal contradiction” in the
development of stable societies. This is not the contradiction that Marx claimed
to have found, but rather an inherent conflict between the colossal economic and
political advantages of peace and stability and the longer-term losses that come
from the accumulating networks of distributional coalitions that can survive only
in stable environments.xxviii
The question then arises, why, if distributional coalitions are so harmful, are they allowed
in developed societies to exist and inhibit other institutions from developing? North might
answer this question by reminding us of his explanation that stability is the primary objective
over efficiency. Olson would agree about the importance of societal stability. While
distributional coalitions are harmful, so is instability.
The dense network of distributional coalitions that eventually emerges in stable
societies is harmful to economic efficiency and growth, but so is instability.
There is no inconsistency in this; just as special-interest groups lead to
misallocations of resources and divert attention from production to distributional
struggle, so instability diverts resources that would otherwise have gone into
productive long-term investments into forms of wealth that are more easily
protected, or even into capital flights to more stable environments. On the
whole, stable countries are more prosperous than unstable ones and this is no
surprise. But, other things being equal, the most rapid growth will occur in
societies that have lately experienced upheaval but are expected nonetheless to be
stable for the foreseeable future.xxix
In his analysis of more developed societies, Olson outlines nine implications for distributional
coalitions. Here, only implications that pertain to this institutional outline are listed3:

3

It would be advantageous for the reader to investigate chapter 3 of Olson’s book The Rise and Decline of
Nations; Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities for a more thorough understanding of collective
action theory.
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4. On balance, special interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and
aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life
more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which
they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their
members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such
redistributions unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the
social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and
firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining
tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new
technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and
thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of
regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understanding, and
changes the direction of social evolution. xxx
Implication four indicates that the presence of special interest organizations reduces the
total income of the society in which they reside because they are not concerned with societal
welfare. Their existence complicates the role of government because governments favor the
short term stability that the distributional coalitions provide. The problem is that political figures
are not accountable for long term sustainability, so by favoring short term stability they may be
risking a reduction of societal welfare over time. Implication five indicates that if organizations
are large enough relative to the society, encompassing as Olson puts it, incentives favor them to
act for the benefit of society because the health of the organization and society are highly
correlated. Implication six reflects on the distributional coalition’s inability to make quick
decisions to the relatively nimble decision-making abilities of individuals and smaller firms.
Implication seven indicates that the presence of distributional coalitions in a society impedes
technological change and hence growth. Implication nine signifies the difficulty of the
government’s role in regulating distributional coalitions, for they bring stability as well as
stagnation, consequently changing the direction of social evolution.
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Conclusions
By fusing together North, Williamson, and Olson’s works on institutions and collective
action I present a list of theoretical criteria that I will use in my analysis of energy institutions in
the United States.

•
•
•
•
•
•

The major formal and informal constraints.
The framework of organizations within the institution.
Level of interaction between organizations.
Punishments and monitoring systems.
Degree of competition and incentive structure for beneficial institutional evolution.
Existence of ‘distributional coalitions’ in the economy.

Before I can analyze energy institutions, the reader must understand what role institutions play
in the grand scheme of economies. The next chapter will do just that, exploring the importance
that institutional change has on growth in developed, capitalist economies.
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2___________________________________________
The Growth of Economies
Western history is replete with examples of the rise and fall of nations and
empires, in both absolute and relative terms. The declines are particularly
important, because they have been propelled by institutional and
organizational failures.
(Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth)

To what can we attribute economic growth in developed capitalist societies? The answer
to this question is not precise. For, if there were a formula that governments could implement to
yield economic growth, all certainly would. Unfortunately, no such formula exists. Because interworkings of individual economies are unique and are subject to different tastes, demands,
supplies, resources, and labor, the job of central bankers and law-makers around the world also
are unique. Law-makers especially because they are the ones responsible for defining and
enforcing property rights, which are a product of the bounded rationalityxxxi rooted in the
informal constraints of each respective society. There is, however, a generalization that I would
offer for all developed economies—stability and institutional change are vital to their perpetual
existence and growth. This chapter focuses on the importance of both stability and institutional
change in developed capitalist economies and why the latter is necessary for economic growth.

What is Capitalism?
When Joseph Schumpeter published Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy he did not believe
that capitalism could survive; yet, it has thrived more than he expected. Schumpeter takes a
pessimistic stance while describing some key factors about capitalism that many other theorists
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interpret in a more positive light. As a general description, “capitalism… is by nature a form or
method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary.”xxxii
Capitalism often gets demonized by its potential negatives, such as environmental
degradation and exploitation of the poor. Capitalism, however, is only the continual process of
organizations exploiting market incentives created by polities. Although Schumpeter may not
agree with this statement, institutionalists might agree that the purpose and reason for capitalism
is to enable personal freedoms and allow for the naturally equilibrated allocation of capital
throughout a society. “Once property rights have been defined and their enforcement assured,
the government steps aside. Resources are allocated to their highest value as the marvel of the
market works its wonders.”xxxiii By allowing individuals to exploit ever-changing consumer
demands, efficiencies are continually promoted throughout the system by means of innovation
and reductions in production and transaction costs. If organizations are allowed to harm the
general wellbeing of society without punishment, it is most likely the fault of the ill-defined
property rights that are delineated by polities. Organizations harming the general wellbeing of
society can also be the result of the costliness of ascertaining violations. Where self enforcing
contracts will be less costly to enforce, non-self enforcing contracts are very costly to enforce
therefore making it difficult to monitor and punish wrong-doers.
The world is not static, it is forever changing. The capitalist economic system reflects
this continual change: “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
enterprise creates.”xxxiv “Creation” cannot, however, come without destruction.
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational
development from the craft shop and factory… illustrate the same process of
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industrial mutation… that incessantly revolutionizes4 the economic structure from
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This
process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.xxxv
Creation and destruction are the two primary pillars of capitalism. These pillars do not put
capitalist societies on a path toward socialism, as Schumpeter indicates, but instead puts them on
a path toward obtaining the ultimate objective of freedom. Capitalist societies strive for personal
freedoms but their efforts are often hindered by corruption. There are many confounding and
corrupting factors that play into real-life capitalist systems. A primary corrupting factor that
derails capitalist societies from their track to freedom is the constriction of free markets.

The Free, and Not So Free, Market
Government-induced constrictions of free markets are reminiscent of socialist
ideologies, where a government will attempt to centrally plan a society using capitalist
mechanisms. Milton Friedman says that “there is an intimate connection between economics
and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible,
and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of
guaranteeing individual freedom.”xxxvi The ultimate goal of a capitalist society, as Friedman would
say, is freedom, with the individual being the ultimate entity. Although Friedman is not an
institutionalist, the principles he outlines about the free market are recognized by institutionalists
as very important to societal health. Individual and economic freedoms foster healthy
democracies. “The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly,
namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic
4

Schumpeter notes here, “Those revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occur in discrete rushes which are
separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works incessantly however, in
the sense that there always is either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution, both together forming
what are known as business cycles.”
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power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.”xxxvii Friedman
might agree that societies which restrict free markets are not truly democratic because
competitive capitalism requires free markets. Government-induced constrictions of the free
market abuse the capitalist mechanism, limiting its capacity to function properly.
The title of this paper refers to capitalism’s creative and destructive capacity. Why should
one care about its creative and destructive capacity? Why should one care about anything that
does not work properly? Without free markets, capitalism’s ability to destroy old, inefficient
institutions and create new ones is severely limited, placing the society at hand in dire risk of
stagnation and an absolute decline in overall welfare. The free markets must, however, function
within a system where property rights are clearly defined and enforced. Take clean air and water
for example, these public goods are the property of the people and should be protected against
encroachment without compensation. If these rights are not clearly defined or enforced,
capitalisms driving force may also steer society toward a decline in welfare, as it has in many
cases of environmental degradation.
The United States likes to boast about itself as being a democratic and free market
capitalist society. However, as explained in the previous paragraph, this can hardly be the case
because the representative government often restricts free markets. As noted in Chapter One,
the ‘free’ in free society does not actually imply total personal and economic freedom. It means
that there are freedoms within a structural matrix of formal and informal constraints (political,
economic, contractual, and social rules of the game) that allow for a society to grow. If a market
is built upon constraints, what is a free market, and can it truly exist in a society? A free market
can indeed exist, but only in a true and healthy democracy where individual freedoms are not
stifled. The matrix of constraints creates the market, but transactions must be allowed to flow
freely. Free-flowing means that there is a level playing field for all rule abiding competitors.
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Market restrictions should only serve to enforce property rights, thereby restricting negative
externalities potentially caused by business operations. These types of restrictions would provide
incentives for efficient market outcomes while at the same time protecting individual rights and
freedoms that would otherwise be encroached upon. The constraints within the matrix are not
dissimilar from friction. Without friction, things would not be able to move or grow. Too much
friction, however, limits movement and growth. A structural matrix of constraints, which
evolves over time, accumulates laws, taxes and subsidies that are often too specific in regard to
technological outcomes, thus creating too much friction. The consequence of formal constraint
specificity will ultimately cause market failure. When the market does not clear at its natural
equilibrium, where marginal social cost equals marginal social benefit and producers pay the total
cost of production, disastrous impediments to sustainability arise.
Take for example this biological metaphor. In order for a heart to function properly
there must be valves that provide a steady flow of blood for life to sustain itself. These valves are
not dissimilar from the structural matrix of constraints that create a market which provides the
production and transaction channels for the economy to be sustainable. If the valves become
clogged, slowing the blood flow, the heart rate will slow down as well. If the valves become so
clogged that the heart cannot get enough blood to function properly the heart will consequently
stop beating. This too will happen if the structural matrix becomes cluttered with excessively
specific constraints. Although institutional matrices are more complex than a heart, the
principles of constraints and sustainable life are very similar.
Governments often create policies that make more friction within a system in attempts
to foster rapid growth. They may, for example, subsidize a specific type of technology for the
purpose of sculpting a particular technological outcome that planners believe to be superior.
This market is not free because it involves a mix of central planning. Nor is it sustainable. When
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a government sponsors a specific type of technology to promote rapid growth over natural
growth, the direction of institutional change will be altered and future stability threatened. As
North stated, the opportunities in a society are determined by institutional constraints because
organizations will be created to take advantage of those opportunities. The evolution of these
organizations will then alter the institutional structure, often times forming distributional
coalitions that bring about a decline in economic wellbeing. This decline causes nations to
become stagnant and limits their ability to adapt to an ever-changing world. By promoting
continuous change through creation and destruction, institutional and organizational failures are
avoided because growth is achieved naturally and sustainability through a market process. From
my perspective, this is why we should be interested in capitalism’s creative and destructive
capacity.

Two Types of Growth
What is the cause of economic growth? The answer, again, is not precise. However, new
institutionalist economic theory explains the importance of institutional change for economic
growth. In the simplest language, a society has resources and inputs. Essentially, growth can be
observed as a society’s increasing ability to adapt and efficiently utilize its resources and inputs.
Elhanan Helpman, in his book The Mystery of Economic Growth, states that “… economists use the
concept of total factor productivity (TFP) to measure the joint effectiveness of all inputs combined
in producing output.”xxxviii The input-to-output ratio is not the same among economies and their
rate of output growth does not equal the contribution of inputs. As Helpman points out:
In a typical data set the growth of output exceeds the contribution of inputs. The
difference between the rate of growth of output and the contribution of input
growth represents the rate of growth of total factor productivity. That is, it
represents the aggregate effect of the various forms of technological change.xxxix
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The crucial point to take from this quote is the involvement that technological change has on
the efficiency of utilizing inputs and its positive influence on economic growth. Economic
growth is positively correlated with total factor productivity, of which an important determinant
is technological change that encourages a more efficient use of inputs. Helpman, cites Simon
Kuznets as stating: “‘since the second half of the nineteenth century, the major source of
economic growth in the developed countries has been science-based technology-in the electrical,
internal combustion, electronic, nuclear, and biological fields, among others.’”xl These types of
technologies, as well as others, have been the primary cause for substantial economic growth
since the industrial revolution.
There are two types of growth that, for the purpose of this thesis, are important to
understand: incremental growth and large-scale growth. It is important to note that both types of
growth can occur in all societies and that most of the time a society will experience incremental
growth, if it is growing at all. A timeline of economic growth can be broken down by milestones,
where a milestone represents a drastic technological shift. Clayton M. Christensen first coined
the type of technology that causes these shifts as ‘disruptive technologies’ in his book The
Innovator’s Dilemma. A disruptive technology is described as follows:
a new technological innovation, product, or service that eventually overturns the
existing dominant technology in the market, despite the fact that the disruptive
technology is both radically different from the leading technology and that it
often initially performs worse than the leading technology according to existing
measures of performance.xli
The term “disruptive” is explanatory of the reaction to existing technologies that become
obsolete. This term is not intended to indicate a negative disruption to the society or its
economy. In fact, after its implementation, the society should experience relatively larger
economic growth because of more efficient utilization of inputs which, as a result, reduced
production and transaction costs that come with the new technology.
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If a capitalist society is to continually gain new efficiencies and reduce transaction costs,
then the growth curve of that society will be upward sloping. The slope of a society’s economic
growth curve over time should presumably get steeper with each disruptive technology because
of the decrease in total cost it causes. Large-scale growth is spurred by disruptive technologies.
Technologies such as the steam engine, electricity, internal combustion engine, automobile,
personal computer, and information technology are prime examples of disruptive technologies
that have enabled enormous levels of economic growth:
Each one of these inventions was drastic rather than incremental; each had the
potential for pervasive use in a wide range of applications, each triggered the
development of many complimentary inputs, and each launched a prolonged
process of adjustment that included the reorganization of the workplace.xlii
Disruptive technologies should be encouraged through incentive schemes that allow the market
to decide what is appropriate in democratic, free market, capitalist societies. Their creation and
implementation is vital to the growth of economies that are seeking reductions in total costs.
Incremental growth occurs during the process of gaining efficiencies after a disruptive
technology is invented and the spread of these efficiencies throughout the economy. These
efficiencies are achieved by means of ‘sustaining technologies’xliii that improve the performance
of the once-disruptive technology. The improvement of efficiency through the innovation of
sustaining technologies plays a large role in determining a society’s total factor productivity,
enabling a society to more efficiently utilize its inputs. In striving for total efficiency, disruptive
technologies must be allowed to develop. Sustaining technologies will than incrementally allow
for marginal increases in output, until yet another disruptive technology is invented and
commercialized.
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Institutional Change
Human beings interact through institutional structures. Often times, institutions are
structured around a specific type of technology. The institutional network of roads and
highways, for example, are the result of the automobile, which was a disruptive technology.
Highway and road systems serve as both sustaining technologies as well as institutions with
formal and informal constraints. Cars are only permitted to drive on the right side of the road
when traffic is traveling in both directions (a formal constraint), and drivers should not exhibit
any action with their vehicles that is in a retaliatory manor to another driver (an informal
constraint). As explained in the previous section, people are constantly seeking to reduce costs.
The innovation of sustaining technologies reduces costs without necessitating the creation of an
entirely new institutional structure. However, when there is a disruptive technological innovation
the latest technology may require new institutions to be constructed. The evolution of
technology has proven this to be true with most disruptions. Institutional change plays an
important role in economic growth. If institutional change did not occur, there would be
economic stagnation and an ultimate decline in welfare because of the society’s inability to adapt
to change.
Institutional change is a requisite for long-term growth, but where does it come from?
North says that “organizations and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in that
role are the agents of, and shape the direction of, institutional change.”xliv These organizations
are formed in response to the institutional framework, or a game. There would be no players
without a game, to use North’s sports analogy. How can it be assured that institutional change
induced by organizations will be beneficial to their respective society? The level of “adaptive
efficiency” permitted by the institutional framework plays an important role in determining this
outcome.
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Adaptive efficiency… is concerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way an
economy evolves through time. It is also concerned with the willingness of a
society to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake
risk and creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and
bottlenecks of the society through time.xlv
A society that has developed distributional coalitions may not be as willing to acquire the
knowledge to induce innovation that spurs disruptive technologies. Distributional coalitions are
more concerned with preserving the current technologies for the purpose of generating more
returns. Without a properly functioning capitalist mechanism, there are no incentives for
organizations to resolve problems and bottlenecks—as long as there are incentives to generate
and redistribute wealth within the organization.
Adaptive efficiency is sculpted by the institutional framework, which is created by the
government. According to North:
…different institutional rules will produce different incentives for tacit
knowledge. That is, the particular institution will not only determine the kinds of
economic activity that will be profitable and viable, but also shape the adaptive
efficiency of the internal structure of firms and other organizations by, for
example, regulating entry, governance structures, and the flexibility of
organizations.xlvi
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that “is acquired in part by practice and can be only partially
communicated....”xlvii If a particular institution fosters the growth of distributional coalitions and
is not conducive to the markets adaptive efficiency, the structure of rent seeking organizations
will grow around outdated technologies. It is up to the government to structure the institutional
matrix, or game, as such so that the players respond to market forces as opposed to corrupting
incentives, such as subsidies.
The incentives embedded in the institutional framework direct the process of
learning by doing and the development of tacit knowledge that will lead
individuals in decision-making process to evolve systems gradually that are
different from the ones that they had to begin with…xlviii
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Natural evolution of the economy, which often occurs gradually, ensures sustainable growth.
Large-scale growth should be allowed to take place due to natural market forces as opposed to
rapid growth caused by specific government-induced incentives. North indirectly indicates why
government should not attempt to specifically induce rapid change:
In a world of uncertainty, no one knows the correct answer to the problems we
confront and no one therefore can, in effect, maximize profits. The society that
permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely to solve problems
through time (a familiar argument of Hayek, 1960). Adaptive efficiency,
therefore, provides the incentives to encourage the development of decentralized
decision-making processes that will allow societies to maximize the efforts
required to explore alternative ways of solving problems. We must also learn
from failures, so that change will consist of the generation of organizational trials
and the elimination of organizational errors. There is nothing simple about this
process, because organizational errors may be not only probabilistic, but also
systematic, due to ideologies that may give people preferences for the kinds of
solutions that are not oriented to adaptive efficiency.xlix
Therefore, the best governmental policy is one that fosters adaptive efficiency through the
enforcement of clearly and well defined property rights, which presumably restrict negative
externalities.

Stability
The real world is not as simple as some of these implications make it seem, making the
job of governments extremely difficult. Democratic governments are faced with the task of
appeasing the immediate demands and needs of the people while positioning themselves for
long-term sustainability. While ensuring the economy’s ability to adapt and change with the
times, there is often too heavy of an emphasis on the government’s role in maintaining shortterm stability. Helpman cites Samuel Huntington’s views on stability:
Huntington (1968) emphasized the role of stability in the survival of regimes. But
change per se does not appear to be harmful to regimes. Rather, change that
results from economic growth is good for the survival of both democratic and
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autocratic regimes, while contraction of income per capita is detrimental to the
survival of both.l
Huntington points out that although stability is vital to the survival of regimes, lack of change
that results in a contraction of income per capita is injurious to a nation’s survival. Despite this
warning, nations often tend to favor the creation of interest groups that ensure stability.
Helpman brings the discussion back to Mancur Olson’s idea of the distributional coalition that
reduces efficiency and threatens the long-term welfare of a nation.
…Olson suggested that the formation of interest groups does not further
economic efficiency. Moreover, stable societies tend to accumulate more groups
that promote their own interests. The activities of these groups then reduce
efficiency and foster political divisiveness. Despite the fact that large
organizations weigh the loss of aggregate efficiency against their own
distributional gains, significant excess burden emerges in societies with such
organized groups. They slow down the social process of decision making, erect
entry barriers, produce complex legal and regulatory frameworks, and complicate
the role of government. As a result they damage a society’s capacity to adopt new
technologies and to reorganize in response to technological change. Thus they
slow growth. In short, in stable societies the number of groups that seek
redistributive gains grows over time and the rate of growth of income per capita
declines.li
This quote summarizes a point that is fundamental to this chapter. Self-interest groups
accumulate in stable societies, such as the United States. These groups reduce efficiency and will
corrupt law-making politicians, creating excess societal burden. The society’s ability to change is
slowed because of specific constrictions implemented into the institutional framework which
favor the distributional coalition. Therefore, in a country such as the United States, capitalism’s
creative and destructive capacity to adopt new technologies and smoothly change institutions is
hindered. This hindrance slows growth and induces a decline in per capita income, which is
more detrimental to a society in the long-run than the attempts at maintaining stability by
government.
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Conclusions
This chapter about the growth of economies coupled with the previous chapter about
institutional theory lays the ground work for my analysis of energy institutions in the United
States. The important points to remember from this chapter, while reading the forthcoming
chapters, are as follows:

•

Capitalism is a creative and destructive method of economic change and is never
stationary. It can enable personal freedoms and allows naturally equilibrated allocation of
capital throughout a society, thus reducing production and transaction costs.

•

In order for the capitalist mechanism to function properly, markets must be free flowing,
with restrictions that enforce well-defined property rights, thereby restricting negative
externalities produced by businesses and consumers.

•

Capitalism fosters large-scale growth, enabled by the innovation of disruptive
technologies, and incremental growth, enabled by the innovation of sustaining
technologies which make the once-disruptive technology more efficient.

•

The ability of a society to quickly adapt with the times, adaptive efficiency, is a crucial
element for institutional change and therefore long-term growth.

•

Stability is crucial to a society’s long-term sustainability, but governments should not
attempt to foster stability in fear of institutional change because distributional coalitions
will subsequently arise, potentially leading to a decline in overall societal welfare.

These five points will be referenced in the upcoming chapters as theories outlined in Chapters
One and Two are applied to energy institutions in the United States.
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Introduction____________________________________
In Part I I provided the theoretical discussion necessary to analyze the institutions that
surround one of the primary sources of economic growth: energy. In this next section I will use
the new institutionalist theory outlined in Chapter One to analyze centralized and decentralized
energy institutions. In Chapter Three I define centralized energy and identify its various forms.
Through comprehensive analysis I explain why centralized electricity institutions in the United
States have become distributional coalitions. Following this claim, I will explore the benefits,
problems, and limitations of centralized electricity production and distribution. In Chapter Four
I define and examine decentralized energy, identifying its various forms. Through more
comprehensive analysis, I will determine that decentralized energy institutions have not yet, and
likely will not after their adoption, become distributional coalitions. Thereafter I explain the
benefits, problems, and limitations of these technologies and the future institutions that could
develop around them. Concluding Chapter Four, I cross-examine centralized and decentralized
energy potentials, exploring the question of why centralized energy has prevailed as the
dominant institution, and explore the rise of decentralized energy against entry barriers.
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3_______________________________
Centralized Energy
Until recently, governments the world over have felt that [energy] was too
“strategic” to be left to the vagaries of the market. In many ways, they
have ensured that oil, gas, and electricity operated outside proper market
principles. Decades of mismanagement, inefficiency, unnecessary pollution,
and excessively high costs have been the result.
(Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People)

The principal foundation of modern economies, energy, is often taken for granted and
yet it is critical for society to function. The institution of ‘centralized energy’ refers to the idea
that electricity is a strategic resource that is provided in a supply driven, top

down system and

cannot be adequately be supplied if left to the free market. The players that make up the
organizational structure produce large quantities of energy in facilities far away from the end
user, who is connected through a transmission grid. The two primary forms of centralized
energy production in the United States and around the world are in the form of fossil fuel based
electricity and oil. Although centralized oil is equally as important to economies around the
globe as electricity, in this thesis I will focus solely on the analysis of centralized electricity
institutions in the United States.

Types of Centralized Energy
Fossil fuel based electricity is primarily produced in large power plants across the
country, producing roughly 800,000 mega-watts of electricity from nearly 5,000 plantslii. Power is
transmitted and sold through the nation’s grid of electric wires, which are connected to factories,
businesses, homes, and learning institutions. Electricity is most often utilized after it is sent
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through the buildings in which we live and conduct business, creating the illusion that the walls
are filled with limitless power. Although energy seems to flow effortlessly through homes and
places of work, seldom does the average American see how their power is actually produced and
almost desensitized people are to the transmission of that electricity. After power is produced in
a coal-fired, natural gas-burning, nuclear, or hydroelectric facility (although hydroelectric and
nuclear are not fossil-fuel based), electricity is transmitted through over 250,000 milesliii of high
and low tension power cables that line streets, highways, and sometimes open plains.
Transformer stations allow for the high voltage electricity to be converted into low voltage
electricity. This system works and has enabled huge success for developed countries over the
past hundred years (although this approach has failed most of the developing world)liv.
Oil, although often synonymous with energy, is not actually a type of energy. Oil is a
practical type of energy carrier like coal or natural gas that, among many other applications aside
from ones energy related, allows for yet another primary foundation of modern economies:
transportation. The network of oil, from ground pump to gas pump, is so conveniently hidden
from most consumers that if it were not for dramatic price fluctuations caused by increases in
demand and shocks to supply chains, it too could be as hidden as electricity generation
networks. Oil is pumped from the ground and piped through distribution networks. From these
networks it can be sent via cargo ship to a gasoline refinery, where it is than trucked to local gas
stations, readily available to be purchased by automobile owners. It can also be trucked directly
to homes where it is pumped into a tank for storage, readily available for heat generation during
cold winter months. The production and transmission of drilled coal and natural gas are very
similar to their liquid energy carrying counterpart, however their contribution to transportation
does not compare to that of oil’s. Their respective applications vary, but the consumers are all
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the same. Like fossil fuel based centralized electricity production, these systems also work and
are irrefutable successes.
Despite the success of these heavily concentrated, or “centralized hub-and-spoke
systems”lv, they are highly inefficient and come with hidden monetary costs. The hidden costs, as
referred to in the Preface, include maintaining outdated power plants, grids, and shipping lines,
as well as militarily securing oil fields and pipelines, and protecting nuclear power plants from
terrorist attacks—not to mention the costs of cleaning up environmental disasters caused by
nuclear accidents, oil spills, and the negative externality costs of pollution endured by society.
The latter is an impossible number to accurately quantify because, aside from the positive
correlation with increased emissions and an increase in human ailments such as respiratory
illnesses, the inconclusive possibility of human induced global warming may be causing
insurmountable and irreversible costs to the entire world. Vijay Vaitheeswaran, in his book Power
to the People, indicates that the economies of scale promised by bigger power plants is what has
enticed governments to support them and turn a blind eye toward their extremely low efficiency
and high environmental costs.
Many of America’s giant coal plants, for example, are well over thirty years old
and barely manage an efficiency rate of 30 to 40 percent; in comparison, the best
combined-heat-and-electricity micropower plants can achieve double that
efficiency. The power industry has also ignored the losses dissipated as heat
incurred in transporting power over wires to distant consumers, which typically
amounts to more than a quarter of the cost of delivered electricity in developed
countries.lvi
In light of the previous chapter’s discussion about inefficiencies being weeded out of the market,
the big question is why have inefficiencies in centralized energy institutions perpetuated? The
answer: organizations that comprise centralized energy institutions in the United States
constitute self-interested distributional coalitions that have been supported by government for
much of the 20th century, whose inefficiencies are hindering economic growth and threatening
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future sustainability. This next section reviews a history of centralized electricity production in
the United States and then interprets the system through North, Williamson, and Olson’s theory
from Chapter One.

Centralized Electricity History
Centralized electricity is by and large an institution. Within this overarching institution
are smaller institutions that are made up of electricity producing organizations. Both overarching
and smaller institutions share and have unique formal and informal organizational constraints. In
order to be officially referred to as an institution, ‘centralized energy’ must be analyzed through
the criteria outlined in Chapter One. Before this, the reader should have an understanding of the
history behind how centralized electricity came to be in the United States. The US Energy
Information Administration’s most recent update on The Changing Structure of the Electric Power
Industry 2000 provides a detailed history of legislation and governmental regulations.
Vaitheeswaran also conveniently explains this detailed history of centralized electricity
production in Power to the People. This summarized history can be attributed to these sources.
Electricity can be produced as direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC). During
the emergence of electricity in the 19th century, there was an ugly struggle between Thomas
Edison’s promotion of DC, which is produced in smaller quantities for local generation, and
Nikola Tesla’s promotion of AC, which has the capability of being transmitted over long
distances. Both forms have their benefits and disadvantages, but ultimately AC won the battle
hands down in the late 19th century because centralized energy generators could produce large
quantities of energy at low costs. Tesla and Edison’s rival companies rushed to bring electricity
to the masses through miles of transmission grids, beginning the reign of top
generation and transmission.
35
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The consumer quickly shifted from local to centralized energy production, as new
technologies like the electric motor demanded more and cheaper electricity. Samuel Insull,
Edison’s aide, came to control Edison’s company and exploited the weak legal system’s anti-trust
regulations, attempting to dominate the entire electricity supply system in the U.S. by
consolidating the industry. He believed the electric industry was a “natural monopoly” and
should not contain any competition because the one supplier would supposedly supply the
cheapest power at the lowest unit cost. Legal representatives feared an episode similar to the
railroad monopolies and instituted the first wave of regulation to electric utilities in the early
1900s. This first wave, however, did not do very much regulating on the industry but rather gave
the utilities the right to seize property as the government can in cases of eminent domain,
making their existence almost legitimate.
Word of regulation led Wall Street to believe that these electric utilities were less risky,
which allowed the utilities access to more funding at cheaper interest rates, thus allowing the
industry to expand. What little regulation there was on the utilities was often evaded because
individual states could not regulate interstate holdings. At this point, individual states were
responsible for most of the regulations. By the end of the 1920s, there were a total of eight giant
holding companies controlling roughly 75% of the electricity supply in the United States. Finally,
under Franklin D. Roosevelt, the depression era laws were passed at the federal level as a part of
the New Deal, totally constricting any type of market freedom in the industry. Most popular was
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935, which restricted holding companies
with regards to mergers, financing, and ownership, placing them under the Securities Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) regulation. Utilities were forced to serve all customers in their local areas
without competition on pricing, quality, or service. Prices were set by public utility boards, not at
the market price, but at the alleged “right” price based on the costs incurred by the utilities.
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Despite the toll that the depression took on the economy, the electric power industry proved
resilient to downward economic forces.
Congress, wanting to increase employment and secure the domestic food supply, passed
the Rural Electrification Act (REA) in 1936. Subsidies under this piece of legislation brought
electricity to American farmers previously too far away from the transmission grids. New Deal
legislation also led to the construction of federally funded dams throughout the country to create
jobs, also solidifying the government’s position with centralized power. Centralized supply
outpaced demand through to the 1960s, with increasing capacity and decreasing costs.
Beginning in the 1960s, with a surge in population amongst the middle class, demand for
electricity quickly outpaced supply as well as capacity growth. Lack of R&D in the electric power
industry, a result of restrictions on competition, ruled out any hope for market based industry
reform. Wide spread centralization of electricity was set in stone as the standard because of
governmental restrictions on competition (the most notorious being the construction of nuclear
power plants during the 1970s). Lack of competition induced R&D resulted in “decades of
mismanagement, inefficiency, unnecessary pollution, and excessively high costs have been the
result.”lvii
A series of four major events from the mid ‘60s to the late ‘70s led to increasing doubt
over state regulation: The Northeast blackout in 1965, the Clean Air Act in 1970 and
amendments in 1977, the oil embargo from 1973-74, and the nuclear regulatory delays caused by
the accident at Three Mile Island. Deregulation of the industry began with the passage of Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978. PURPA is known as the “catalyst for
competition” in the electric power industry. Liberalization of energy markets continued in the
‘90s with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, allowing for the expansion of non-utility
markets. PUHCA was repealed with the 2005 Comprehensive Energy Bill, allowing holding
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companies to once again own utilities and removing SEC regulation. However, the reemergence
of monopolistic energy utilities is an unlikely scenario. What is more likely is a decentralization
of the players, creating a competitive market place where new alternative forms of energy
technologies in non-utility markets are allowed to enter the arena, most likely increasing
efficiencies through market based competition.

Centralized Electricity Institution
Now that the reader is familiar with the development of government backed centralized
electricity production in the United States, the analysis of the institutions will be much better
understood. The first criterion to identify is the structure of formal and informal constraints that
comprise the centralized electricity institution. The formal constraint structure consists of the written
rules that create the incentive and disincentive structure within which institutions are allowed to
grow. There are three types of written rules that comprise formal constraints: political,
economic, and contractual. Written rules are often created in the interest of private, as opposed
to social well-being. As noted in the previous section, PUHCA, REA, PURPA (under the
National Energy Act of 1978), EPACT, and the 2005 Comprehensive Energy Bill comprise the
major political rules. The incentive structures put forth by these legislations have created specific
opportunity sets and fostered the growth of centralized electricity organizations. Where initial
regulation constricted competition, inefficiencies were allowed to perpetuate for decades. The
outcome of this regulation was a lack of change from the 1920s until reform began in the 1980s.
The government and local monopolies that have long controlled the generation,
transmission, and retail distribution of power never had much incentive to
encourage innovation or invest in new approaches to power delivery. Since
market forces were suppressed, the gross inefficiency of energy utilities did not
seem to matter terribly much.lviii
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This statement indicates that the formal constraints have not, until recently, allowed for
competition. The degree of competition and incentive structure for beneficial evolution has been absent from
this industry until the past two decades. The institutions that remain, even after deregulation has
begun, are outdated, and new institutions have yet to emerge because of the lack of R&D spent
on new technologies.
The informal constraints of centralized energy have been created by the tradition of readily
available electricity that flows through the walls of buildings, homes, and factories. People make
choices based on this informal constraint and it is embedded into our every day decision making
mental constructs. The average person’s complacency about electricity supply denotes its very
existence as an informal constraint. Electricity has become something people use every day
without having to think about, just as traditions shape the way people greet each other or taboos
restrict people from diverging from cultural norms. Readily available electricity, the product of its
suppliers’ exploitation of formal rules, has become a socially sanctioned norm in every day life and a standard
medium for power, making its existence both subtle and highly visible throughout modern society. Oliver
Williamson says informal constraints “are ‘adopted’ and thereafter display a great deal of
inertia—some because they are functional (as with conventions)” and “are pervasively linked
with complementary institutions (formal and informal), etc.”lix People would demand electricity
if it were gone tomorrow because of its pervasiveness throughout our society. Therefore, the
utility of the informal constraint could not be changed over night. Electricity itself is an informal
constraint because it has created a “…lasting grip on the way society conducts itself.”lx If
anything were to be changed about the consumption of electricity, it would have to be the rate
of efficiency in consumption or in generation and transmission from producer to consumer.
These changes, however, would not disrupt the utility of the informal structure.
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The framework of organizations within the centralized electricity institution is not difficult to
see. As mentioned earlier there are different types of centralized energy producing players in the
game, comprised of coal-fired, natural gas-burning, nuclear, and hydroelectric power companies.
By law, players are either utilities or non-utilities. The Energy Information Administration
defines utilities as “either privately owned companies or public agencies engaged in generation,
transmission, and / or distribution of electric power for public use.”lxi Utilities are primarily
centralized energy producers because of the long history of government backed centralization.
“Non-utilities are privately owned entities that generate power for their own use and / or for
sale to utilities and others.”lxii Non-utilities are comprised of both centralized and non centralized
energy producers because they emerged with the passage of PURPA. These two types of
producers have two common objectives: the generation of power and the desire to earn a profit.
The government is an organization that serves as an official to these players (the government is
also a player in some cases, owning and operating a portion of total capacity). Its role is to
ensure the game of producing and delivering energy is played by certain rules, so that the lights
stay on and the producers do not take advantage of the consumer.
Since the passage of PUHCA, the level of interaction that the centralized energy producing
players have had with the officiating organization was very close in that the official saw to it that
the game was played in a specific and static way. The lack of evolution of ideas from the norm in
the centralized energy industry from the early to the late 20th century exemplifies this constricting
relationship. Industry players have continued to invest in capital intensive centralized projects
that aim to generate more megawatts from one source. Since the 1980s, however, the
constrictions have been slowly relieved, allowing the game to be played with increasing levels of
competition.
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The punishment and monitoring system in the centralized energy institution has evolved over
time. As indicated in Chapter One, the costliness of ascertaining violations is important for the
functioning of institutions. The reason why PUHCA and other regulatory laws were established
was to prevent privately owned “natural monopolies” from exploiting the consumer, and to
provide incentives for the electrification of the entire country. This was, at the time, the only way
for the government to supply the country with a “strategic resource” and keep the suppliers
from harming consumers with high prices. Otherwise, the costliness of enforcement would be
too high because of technological limitations. With a premature legal system based around a
limited cognitive competence for public goods, the only perceived way to avoid consumer
deficits was to ensure that the contracts between supplier and consumer were “fair”, which
would help to make them self enforcing. Public utility boards arrived at a “fair” price based on
costs endured by the utility. Unfortunately, the immediate benefit to the consumer may not have
been worth the cost in terms of lost efficiencies and pollution caused by a lack of competition
induced change in technologies over time. In quest for the self-enforcing contract, the state
attempted to assure that the consumer was provided electricity because it is of strategic
importance to growth and security, and that the consumer would pay the bills because it is more
beneficial to pay than to be without power.
Since these forms of centralized energy were allowed to perpetuate without change for
so many years, their institutions have become distributional coalitions that are harming societal
welfare by reducing total income based on the theoretical model outlined in Chapter One. The
underlying cause being that stability has been the government’s primary objective over
efficiency. Centralized energy producers are rent seeking organizations that, as a collective, have
become large enough to steer institutional change. Their existence complicates the role of
government because stability is viewed as more important than long-term societal welfare. They
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are large enough to have their contribution benefit society to some degree so that a symbiotic
relationship is formed. Their presence has impeded technological change and they have an
inability to make quick decisions like smaller organizations have. Government has had a difficult
time regulating them because they bring about stability and stagnation, changing the direction of
social evolution.

Benefits
Admittedly, centralized energy has enabled many benefits to developed societies across
the world. In countries where large sums of startup capital are available for big projects, power
has been provided to the masses through top

down systems that function with high levels of

reliability. Jobs have been created in the private companies that comprise the overarching
institution and industry, contributing to economic growth. Jobs have also been created in
desperate times of need, like during the Great Depression when the REA mandated the building
of massive dams and establishment of cooperatives to bring power to the American farmer. The
government has, at least for almost an entire century, fostered stability and facilitated economic
growth, which are top priorities.

Problems & Limitations
Despite the obvious economic benefits of centralized energy production during the
majority of the 20th century, there are many problems and limitations that present decision
makers with some interesting challenges for the future of energy. These problems are the result
of what Williamson calls humans “bounded rationality” about the negative externalities of
centralized fossil fuel based energy. Pollution, caused by the emissions from the combustion of
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fossil fuels is poisoning the earth. “Among the gases emitted during the burning of fossil fuels
are sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NO), and carbon dioxide (CO2).”lxiii The centralized
energy approach has also failed most of the developing world, “…where more than a billion and
a half people still lack access to grid electricity.”lxiv Inefficiencies in centralized generation speak
for themselves, relative to decentralized generation. Coal fired plants, which accounts for over
50% of total electricity generation, overall reach a maximum of roughly 40% efficiency.lxv Waste
energy in the form of heat and steam are often not utilized, making roughly 50% of the nation’s
electricity generation half as efficient as it could be if it were generated by micropower.
Pollution and inefficiencies are issues plaguing the developed world, while much of the
developing world remains in the dark (not to mention being burdened by the developed world’s
emissions). Although these factors play a huge role in sustainability, they are not paramount to
the central theme of this study, economic growth. According to the very first page of the
National Energy Policy, signed in May of 2001 by Vice President Dick Cheney, consumer energy
demand will dramatically outpace domestic energy production at current capacity growth rates
over a projected twenty year period.lxvi Essentially, centralized supply cannot keep pace with
projected increasing demand, limiting economic growth. Centralized energy was a creative
endeavor that emerged in response to the problem of power scarcity and has been a large
success. However, the perpetuation of its existence to satisfy future demand in light of obvious
system inefficiencies is not creative and productive. Increasing demand that outpaces supply
capacity should cause prices to increase, thereby making alternative forms of energy more
economically attractive. But at what cost will this occur and will there be stagnation in the
transition process? North indicates that “sometimes the way experiences have interacted with
consciousness has led to institutions that resulted in stagnation with resultant human frustration
in the context of more dynamic societies.”lxvii In order to prevent stagnation, the dynamic United
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States should recognize its experience with the inefficiencies of centralized energy and respond
to the future energy demand by looking to alternative means of energy before prices are driven
up. Policy makers who believe that future demand should be satisfied by more capital intensive
centralized projects should expand their bounded rationality and understand that decentralized
technologies must be allowed to enter the market more quickly in order to facilitate a smooth
transition.
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4_______________________________
Decentralized Energy
Imagine a world in which power flows not from on high, but from the
masses. In such as world, important decisions would be dictated not by the
whims of grandees, but by the needs and wants of ordinary people. The
price of meeting these desires would be set not by bureaucrats, but by the
robust interplay of supply and demand. In politics, such principles are the
cornerstones of democracy. In economics, they are the foundation of
capitalism.
(Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People)

The alternative to centralized energy is decentralized energy. The institution of
‘decentralized energy’ refers to the idea that electricity is produced relatively close to the enduser, wherever the end-user requires it, in a demand driven, bottom

up system. There is a

wide array of renewable, decentralized energy options that can supply the energy demands of
virtually any consumer in any location. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has
identified solar, wind, geothermal, bio-mass, and hydrogen fuel cells, as major R&D areas that
have great energy producing potential. NREL leaves out microturbines as a major R&D area but
they too have great potential. These particular forms of decentralized energy are notable because
they have the ability to be renewable energy producers, meaning they don’t rely on finite
resources to continue producing power. Most of these forms of energy also have the ability to
be emissions-free or discharge much less harmful emissions into the environment as byproducts
relative to centralized fossil fuel based energy producers. Coupling renewable and non-emitting
aspects makes these forms of energy sustainable for long-term societal and economic
development. The advantages of decentralized over centralized include improved system
efficiencies, reduced pollution, and consumer choice.
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The institutions that surround these types of energy production do not constitute
distributional coalitions. This is in part because they are still in the developmental growth phase
and haven’t yet reached a percentage of total energy capacity comparable to centralized energy in
order to allow them pricing power. However, the primary reason is because the decentralized
institutional structure is a bottom

up system as opposed to top

down system. Users that

utilize decentralized energy choose where their energy is produced and do not rely on centralized
energy producers in their region, which may not have every individual user’s interests in mind.
Users of decentralized energy are exemplars of true freedom because of the choice that they are
able to make with their dollar. While centralized energy achieves cost reducing economies of
scale by producing vast amounts of energy, decentralized energy will become competitively
priced by taking advantage of the economies of scale associated with producing a large quantity
of power generating units such as fuel cells. The construction of this market for decentralized
energy is demand driven as opposed to supply driven. The consumer in this market is given the
freedom to choose which type of energy best suits them. This freedom of choice is the truest
principle of democracy and capitalism.
This chapter will follow a similar format as the previous chapter. First I will discuss
various types of decentralized energy and then analyze the overarching institutional structure for
these technologies. In the next section I review the benefits of these technologies and the
institution for society as a whole. Following this section I analyze the problems, limitations and
barriers to market entry for these technologies. Concluding the chapter I will explain why
centralized energy has evolved as the dominant institution.
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Types of Decentralized Energy
Before I discuss different type of decentralized energy a point of clarification should be
made. Thus far, this study has referred to energy and electricity. People demand energy in many
forms, electricity being one of those forms. Often times, people use different types of energy to
create different products to satisfy demands such as the heating and cooling of water and
interior climate. When someone wants to heat their home they can simply turn up the
thermostat. The same goes for cooling where someone might either turn on a fan or lower the
thermostat. These examples use electricity to supply the consumer’s demand. A large percentage
of the electricity demanded in the United States is for heating and cooling. Some forms of
decentralized energy bypass the need for electricity in supplying this demand, subsequently
decreasing the total demand for electricity and increasing system efficiency. When efficiencies
are improved at both the supply and demand ends, there is less waste; hence greater system
efficiency because the consumer is getting the same amount of utility by using fewer resources.
Therefore, many of the following forms of decentralized energy are referred to as ‘energy’ as
opposed to decentralized ‘electricity’ because they supply energy needs other than those
electricity related.
Most forms of energy used today are technically a form of solar energy. Fossilized plants
and animals from some point in history used the sun’s energy, in processes such as
photosynthesis, and their remnants are stored in the form of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, oil, gas, etc.).
However, the forms of solar energy referred to here are renewable direct and indirect solar
energy used to generate electricity and heat. Currently the most widely known form of direct
solar generated electricity uses crystalline silicon semiconductors to make photovoltaic cells (PV
cells). This type of direct solar power utilizes PV cells to capture the suns rays and generate
electricity on site by allowing photons emitted by the sun to knock an electron off of the
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semiconductive material of the panel to create a current. PV cells like these are not yet
competitively priced on a per kilowatt hour (kwh) scale, costing between 20 and 25 cents per
kwh versus typical grid electricity in the United States that costs between 3 and 5 cents per
kwh.lxviii Solar power is being realized in niche markets today where grid electricity is unavailable
or unreliable, such as in very rural homes and road maintenance signs. Improvements in solar
technology have increased efficiency to convert 15% of the suns light into electricity, a great
improvement from cells built in the 1950s, which only achieved a maximum of 4% efficiency.

New entrepreneurs are rethinking traditional solar energy technology, which for the past
thirty years has been focused around crystalline silicon semiconductors, for a number of reasons.
One reason being the silicon wafer market is experiencing shortages caused by increasing
demand and driving production costs up. Aside from material shortages, the technology has a
poor efficiency to cost ratio versus traditional energy technologies, therefore entrepreneurs are
seeking new ways to harness the sun’s energy. Some companies are investing in transparent thin
film technology for building integrated PV windows that use “thin layers of copper, indium and
gallium selenide pioneered at America’s [NREL].”lxix Others are researching technologies that
utilize mirrors to concentrate the suns power to heat a stored substance in order to create
mechanical energy from its expansion and contraction. Organic substances and nanotechnologies are newer stage ideas and may play a large role in reducing costs and materials in
existing technologies. Indirect solar energy is harnessed for use in applications such as heating
pools, bathing and drinking water, as well as interior climates by means of fluid circuits. Indirect
solar technologies have the potential to drastically reduce total electricity demand because they
bypass the need for electricity in some heating applications.
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People have been harnessing the wind for thousands of years to generate mechanical
energy and for sailing boats. Today, turbines that capture the winds energy are capable of
generating the least costly form of renewable, decentralized electricity. Windmills come in
varying sizes. A turbine less than one meter in diameter and a few meters high can generate a
few hundred watts (a typical incandescent light bulb requires 60 watts). Whereas currently the
largest turbine in the world, which is 63 meters in diameter and 123 meters high, residing off the
coast of Denmark, generates on average enough power to provide for 5,000 homes, roughly 5
megawatts. Wind turbines have the potential to be a very decentralized energy provider, or, in
the case of Denmark’s 5 megawatt turbine, a less decentralized energy provider. However, it is
still a renewable energy source, relieving dependence on finite resources. When the wind is
blowing, turbines have the potential to generate electricity at comparable prices to coal and
natural gas fired plants, around 5 cents per kWh, and less than centralized nuclear energy, which
costs roughly 6 cents per kwh.lxx
Geothermal energy can be used for generating electricity or for heating and cooling
applications. Regarding electricity generation, geothermal energy accounts for roughly 2,800
megawatts of capacity in the United States and costs from 4-6 cents in steam plants and 5-8
cents in binary plants.lxxi Electricity generation in geothermal plants are often smaller scale than
coal fired and natural gas plants, releasing only small amounts of gaseous emissions in steam
plants and zero emissions from binary plants. The other form of geothermal energy, used for air
and water heating and cooling, is much more decentralized than electricity generating geothermal
technology. A home, for example, with a geothermal system requires nothing more than good
insulation for internal climate control. Ground source heat pumps use a liquid, such as water, as
the energy carrier in order to transmit the constant temperature beneath the earth’s surface into
the desired application: water heating or temperature heating and cooling. Utilizing a system,
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such as this one, decreases electricity demands that may be used for water heating and climate
control.
Biomass is biological material, such as ethanol, biogas, or biodiesel, which can be easily
substituted for conventional energy carrying materials like oil and gas.lxxii Biomass has the
potential to be centralized or decentralized because there are so many options for use. Farmers,
for example, that may not have access to cheap centralized energy could capture the biogas
emitted by rotting plant or livestock waste and use it to fire microturbines for electricity. A
microturbine is an extremely efficient rotary engine that uses the same principle as wind turbines
to produce electricity, the difference being the fuels. Farmers also have the opportunity to
centrally provide energy instead of food, inexpensively producing fuels, like ethanol from corn
or switchgrass for use in today’s vehicles.
Hydrogen fuel cells are the holy grail of decentralized energy. By means of a chemical
reaction between stored hydrogen and ambient oxygen, fuel cells produce electricity.
A fuel cell is made up of a negatively charged anode on one side, a positively
charged cathode on the other, and an electrolyte in the middle that is made up of
an alkaline or watery acidic solution or a plastic membrane, allowing the
electrically charged hydrogen atoms to travel from the anode to the cathode.
Commercial fuel cells are composed of many individual cells stacked atop one
another. Hydrogen is fed into the anode side of the cell, where a chemical
reaction splits the hydrogen atom into a proton and an electron. Freed electrons
exit through the external electrical circuit in the form of direct current
electricity.lxxiii
Emitting nothing but water vapor and heat, these silent marvels of modern technology have the
potential to completely reorganize the way energy is distributed. The concept of the fuel cell
dates back over one hundred years, but the technology has yet to become commercially viable
on a scale comparable to the internal combustion engine. However in the future, the fuel cell
could play an enormous role in meeting the demands of increasing energy consumption. Jeremy
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Rifkin talks about hydrogen fuel cells revolutionizing the way energy is generated and distributed
in The Hydrogen Economy, forming a network of “hydrogen energy webs,” or HEW’s.
Today, hydrogen and the new fuel-cell distributed-generation technology are
beginning to fuse with the computer and telecommunications revolution to
create a wholly new economic era. The individual fuel cells that make up the
growing distributed-generation revolution are just now being connected to one
another with the help of sophisticated computer software, smart digital
technologies, and internet access to form the beginnings of a distributed-energy
web. Soon, end-users will not only produce their own electricity but be able to
share it with others, posing a fundamental challenge to the current top-down,
uni-directional energy regime currently in place around the world.lxxiv
In order for this to happen, fuel cell companies must reduce the cost of their product to
compete with centralized power generation; and, hydrogen producers must find less costly and
more efficient ways to produce, store, and distribute hydrogen. HEW’s have the potential to
rapidly change the energy market much like the internet did the information and media markets,
which lead to the largest and longest uninterrupted period of economic growth in American
history during the 1990s.

Decentralized Energy Institution
Do decentralized energy institutions exist yet? Not comparable to that of centralized
energy, but yes an overarching decentralized energy institution does exist and is growing. The
primary difference is the direction of integration. The top

down system generates, transmits,

and supplies energy from the centralized producer down to the consumer. The bottom

up

system involves the generation and direct consumption or resale of energy from the
decentralized producer to consumer. A top

down system is supply driven, meaning that

peoples energy demands are supplied on the terms of the centralized producer, baring the
consumer from choice. The bottom

up, decentralized, system is demand driven, which takes

into account the individual’s energy demands and allows for choice in the process.
52

Decentralized Energy
Although there are many small individual institutions comprising the overarching
decentralized energy institution, they all share theses similarities, or informal constraints: bottom
up systems, choice power to the consumer, the potential to be environmentally friendly when
produced by renewable sources, improved system efficiencies over centralized power generation,
and finally electricity is considered a publicly traded commodity as opposed to a centrally
supplied resource. This last informal constraint is important to understand because when people
begin to change their view of electricity as a centrally supplied resource to a traded commodity,
micro-markets will begin to trade electricity openly, providing incentives for producers to find
cheaper means to produce and trade it. Electricity cannot be stored without some type of powersacrificing battery—it must be produced and then consumed. For this reason, the centralized
approach does not allow for it to be considered a commodity because the resale is always less
valuable than the original product, making consumption the only option. If electricity were to be
produced from the bottom

up, consumers could also be producers who trade power on

micro-levels as if it were a publicly traded commodity. The ability to trade energy at the microlevel is an incentive for smaller producers to find cheap ways of generating power. In order for
these markets to emerge, investment and development needs to happen with energy information
technology that could handle the millions of transactions that would take place. The formal
constraints, or rules, of this type of institution would have to enforce property rights and enforce
the contracts of these micro-markets. In order for this type of system to be sustainable, better
and more clearly defined property rights for public goods would have to be established so that
smaller producers would be prohibited from creating pollution.
The framework of organizations within the decentralized energy institution is different than
that of the centralized energy institution because of its demand driven nature. Decentralized
organizations consist of producers of energy technologies, consumers of those technologies,
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producers of electricity, and consumers of that electricity. After the technology is produced and
sold, the consumer may become both a producer and consumer of electricity. The players in this
game are organized very differently. Where under the centralized institution the producers are
the sole provider of power to the consumer, this decentralized institution contains producers of
power who are also the consumer, who can also provide power to other consumers. The
government still plays an officiating role in this institution, acting as a body to enforce contracts
and property rights, as well as a producer of its own distributed energy. Although transaction
costs may be higher in punishment and enforcement of micro-market contracts, developments
in smart information technology that hold digital transaction history records will be necessary
preventatives against violations of contract infringement.
The players within this demand driven market create lots of competition amongst
themselves and will thus benefit the economy. The competitive level of interaction between
organizations in this bottom
top

up institution has the potential to be much more complex than the

down system because of the incentives to create new markets for trading micro-energy.

Smart energy technologies will use real-time production and consumption sensors to allow for
peer-to-peer energy, via a grid that is conceptually similar to the internet, enabling microproducers to trade energy from producer to user in a limitless number of micro-markets all over
the country. The high rate of efficiency at which these micro-markets could demonstrate will
allow for cost savings on the exchange and production of energy. The competitive nature of this
institution, caused by the interaction between organizations, will be brought on by increased
efficiencies, smart technologies, and reduced negative externalities, having a beneficial impact on
the overall economy’s performance. An essential part of the functioning of this type of
institution, however, is the costliness of ascertaining violations of property rights and contract
breeching. A nationwide distributed energy infrastructure may be more difficult for the
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government, in terms of monitoring and punishment, because there are so many more players in the
game. Although an advantage of this high-tech system is that digital recording of energy
transactions can be required by law to make cheating the system very difficult. The incentive not
to cheat makes contracts self-enforcing, causing the occurrence of violations to decline, and yet
again making the system more efficient.
Two factors contributing to the rise of decentralized energy against the centralized
energy distributional coalition are product diversity and competition. There are many different
ways to generate electricity and other forms of energy. Therefore, there are many players
competing to develop, market, and distribute the least expensive technology. The high degree of
competition in the decentralized energy business is providing incentives for organizations to cut
costs, which benefits the consumer and the evolution of the institution. The efficiency level of
the decentralized energy institution is high because of this high level of competition. There are
two primary reasons why people are now demanding these products more than in the past. First,
the general knowledge about the negative externalities caused by centralized energy is expanding
people’s limited cognitive competence. In other words, people’s sense of rationality is improving
and they are more intelligent because of it, causing them to be more democratic with the dollars
they spend. Second, as already noted, alternatives are becoming price competitive in some niche
markets.
The very nature of decentralized energy production emphasizes smaller is better.
Distributional coalitions are organizations that will grow large enough to steer institutional
change for the purpose of perpetuating their own existence. With many individual players in the
bottom

up micro-energy-generating and -trading game, it is difficult to imagine one individual

agent growing large enough to steer institutional change. The producers of the technologies that
generate energy could potentially grow large enough to steer institutional change, however, those
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producers are currently in a position to steer institutional change for societal benefit. Energy
trading organizations, similar to Enron, could potentially become large enough to steer
institutional change. Under a nationwide decentralized energy network, however, it seems more
probable that these types of organizations could not profit unless the size of the energy traded
were very substantial, like the energy produced from centralized sources. Decentralized energy
technology producers are in direct competition with centralized energy producers and therefore
have an incentive to cut costs and prices to work their products into the market, benefiting the
consumer. If a decentralized energy distributional coalition were to arise it would occur after
centralized energy became the higher priced alternative. When this occurs, centralized energy
companies will be forced to restructure their business model to respect the consumer demand
for more efficient, decentralized energy technologies.

Benefits
There are many benefits that may come from a widespread implementation of
decentralized energy. The paramount benefit being sustainable economic growth, achieved
through: an ability to supply the country’s ever increasing energy demand, reduced costs from
the economies of scale in mass production of energy-generating units, job creation, reduced
emission and externalities, increased system efficiencies, and increased reliability. There is also
the likely possibility of spillover benefits to developing countries from the improved technology
R&D in energy generation.
According to the National Energy Policy, US energy consumption will increase 32
percent by 2020. “Our nation’s most pressing long-term electricity challenge is to build enough
new generation and transmission capacity to meet projected growth in demand.”lxxv Proponents
of centralized energy are advocating the construction of new power plants, however, “even with
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adequate generating capacity, we do not have the infrastructure to ensure reliable supply of
electricity.”lxxvi At current generation capacity growth, there will be an energy shortfall to the
equivalent of 1300 to 1900 new power plants by 2020 (See Appendix C). Decentralized energy
utilization provides the potential to bypass the need for new generating and transmission
capacity by providing for the consumer at the source of demand. Due to the very large demand
of distributed generating units, economies of scale will be achieved not by producing large
amounts of power but by manufacturing large amounts of units. Employment may also increase
due to a rise in demand for generating units. Centralized energy will co-exist with decentralized
energy until the capacity of decentralized producers outpaces demand for power.
Retail centralized energy prices do not reflect the real costs that society pays for in the
production process. The negative externality costs that society indirectly pays for in a centralized
fossil fuel based system are drastically reduced in a decentralized system, and eliminating them in
many cases. The reduction and potential elimination of emissions consequent of decentralized
energy could lead to an increase in monetary liquidity and disposable income for consumers and
businesses. Increased disposable income for consumers, who represent 2/3 of the economy, will
increase marginal spending. Reduced energy costs for businesses will allow more money to be
put towards new plant and equipment or R&D. Reduced energy costs are very advantageous for
sustainable economic growth over the long run. Growth will also come from the efficiencies
found in micro-energy-generation and -trading markets as system efficiencies will increase
reliability, reducing costs endured by the victims of blackouts.

Problems, Limitations, and Barriers to Market Entry
During the 20th century, when centralized energy reigned as the only option for
consumers, there was little need for R&D supporting alternative energy technologies.
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Governmental R&D budgets for energy started to decline beginning in the 1980s as markets
were opened to foster private investment.lxxvii Decentralized energy technology investment began
to increase at this time, however, most of these technologies haven’t been able to gain major
market share. The cost per kilowatt for many of the previously mentioned distributed energy
technologies is still too high for many primary applications relative to centralized energy and
they therefore have only been able to tap small markets.
The centralized energy distributional coalition is presently the standard medium for mass
power generation, preventing distributed energies from breeching the primary energy market.
Solar generated electricity, with a current maximum efficiency of just 15% and at best costing
four times as much as most centralized generation, is not commercially viable without long term
financing schemes. Wind power has the most potential growth against centralized power
because it can be competitively priced, but has its problems as well. Demand does not decline
when the wind stops, but no wind consequently means no power generation. When there is no
power, reliance is left on centralized plants which are not easy to quickly switch on and off.
Sudden wind, creating lots of power, could also potentially cause gluts in the existing grid.
Geothermal energy requires drilling and a potentially high initial capital cost that can be
overcome by grants and long-term financing, but the payback period is known to be very
lengthy. Biomass is promising, however, decentralized biomass electricity applications with the
use of microturbines are only available in niche markets like farming. Hydrogen fuel cells, like
PV paneling, are not competitively priced with centralized generation. Supply capacity is also
limited because these technologies are still in developmental phases. These are some of the
problems associated with the previously cited distributed energy technologies. Diversification of
energy sources is a good solution to these problems in the transition process.
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Energy policy expert Howard Gellar cites nine particular barriers to market entry for
what he cites as energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies: limited supply
infrastructure, quality problems, insufficient information and training, misplaced incentives, lack
of money or financing, purchasing procedures, pricing and tax barriers, regulatory and utility
barriers, and political obstacles.lxxviii These nine barriers can also be used to describe barriers for
the decentralized energy technologies market because of their potential to be renewable energy
sources with higher system efficiencies relative to centralized fossil fuel based generation.
Due to the lack of demand for decentralized energies until the late 20th century, “energyefficient technologies are not produced or readily available… creating a vicious cycle where,
because demand is low, suppliers do not make products or services available, and demand
remains low due to limited availability.”lxxix This problem of limited supply infrastructure has been
especially the case for photovoltaic cells and hydrogen fuel cells. Demand is low and there is also
no central market for the demand, so market entry for suppliers is difficult due to high sales,
marketing and transaction costs. The growing industry needs more market information to reduce
these costs.
Wind turbines and photovoltaic cells occasionally do not achieve their maximum
efficiency rating because of installations that aren’t well thought out. This issue of poor
installation quality and energy potential is related to insufficient information and training for installing
these types of technologies. Another issue related to insufficient information is awareness. If
consumers aren’t aware of decentralized energy options or how these technologies could help
reduce long-term costs than they will stick to what the standard is, centralized energy. Lack of a
standard in the renewable decentralized energy industry opens the door to poor service and
repair capacity.
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The market for energy provides misplaced incentive structures that often favor centralized
energy because “the financial interests of those responsible for purchasing energy efficiency
measures may not be aligned with those who would benefit from the purchase.” The upfront
costs of implementing efficient decentralized energy systems are often more expensive than
having centralized energy provide the power. The purchasing procedures of newly built or renovated
buildings focus on the “least first cost, not the least life-cycle cost”lxxx of the structure. Financing
incentives that have the potential to change the market place to favor more efficient
decentralized energy products are currently not offered on a large enough scale to make a
significant impact on the broader energy market.
Exclusionary pricing and taxes are also preventing more efficient decentralized energy
technologies from entering the market place. Subsidies of over $140 billion to the nuclear power
industry from 1947 to 1999 have enabled the industry to now contribute 20% of the United
States’ electricity generation, excluding decentralized energy technologies from these markets.lxxxi
As referred to in previous sections, centralized fossil fuel based energy prices do not reflect the
total cost to society, in terms of negative externality costs, leading to “excessive consumption,
relative to what would be socially desirable.”lxxxii Not only do prices not reflect total societal
costs, they also do not provide financial incentives for efficient usage because consumers pay the
average price instead of the marginal price for power. If it costs a utility less to produce power
on off-peak hours, the price for these hours should be less, encouraging consumers to use more
power during off-peak hours. Smart metering systems are not widely used, however, so
consumers don’t have any incentive to use less during peak and more during off-peak hours. Tax
policies also discourage efficient decentralized energy technologies that are capital intensive.
Businesses, for example, are allowed to deduct most energy costs from their flow of revenue
before determining their income taxes. Consumers, for example, do not pay a sales tax on fuel
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and electricity, but do have to pay sales tax on energy efficient technologies. These taxes are
huge barriers against capital intensive decentralized technologies from entering the market.
Although deregulation and privatization are helping move markets in the right direction,
they also have the potential to exclude efficient decentralized energy. The regulatory and utility
barriers that deregulation is designed to break are in some cases promoting top

down systems,

which discourages the utilities from putting money or management activities towards demand
side efficiencies. The separation of generation, transmission, and distribution into private entities
places incentives on the sale of more electricity, not efficient usage. This also inhibits on site
cogeneration systems because utilities do not have the incentive to buy back power at a
reasonable rate. The utilities may also charge hefty interconnection fees, or high disconnection
fees from the centralized grid.
Finally, the political barriers are one of the best examples of how distributional coalitions
are attempting to perpetuate their own existence by altering the institutional structure. The
centralized fossil fuel based energy industry has huge lobbies that oppose the adoption of
restrictive measures such as carbon dioxide emissions taxes.
These business interests have a great deal of political clout and are highly
motivated to block the adoption of policies that are perceived to be harmful…
The fossil fuel industries contribute heavily to political campaigns, and their
political influence has blocked the adoption of higher energy taxes or taxes on
carbon dioxide emissions.lxxxiii
Geller references legislation proposed by President Bill Clinton in 1993 for the adoption of a
small energy tax based on the British thermal unit (Btu). The bill called for a tax of 26 cents per
million Btu’s when using coal, natural gas, or nuclear, and 61 cents per million Btu’s when using
petroleum. This green tax would create tax free Btu’s when consumers used renewable wind,
solar, and geothermal sources. The fossil fuel industry lobbied congress and squashed this
legislation, exemplifying how the centralized energy distributional coalition’s political clout
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allows them to alter the institutional structure for their own benefit, not in line with societal
benefit.
Geller believes that it is possible to overcome many of these barriers through policies
which, “eliminate price subsidies, make energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies
readily available, improve the performance of these technologies, educate and train consumers,
require certain levels of efficiency of renewable energy use, or provide convenient financing.”lxxxiv
The barriers he notes that will be harder to overcome are those which give priority to low
upfront energy costs versus low life cycle energy costs of a building. These policies are crucial
political measures to reduce many of the barriers to market entry for decentralized energy
technologies. The most crucial policy change that Geller does not discuss, however, is the
redefining of property rights for public goods: clean air and water. Individuals that have the right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should also have the right to clean air and water.

Centralized vs. Decentralized Energy
If it is true that a shift from centralized to decentralized energy would in fact foster
economic growth and sustainability, the question arises: Why has centralized energy prevailed
over decentralized energy? The answer takes us back to what North and Williamson call human’s
limited cognitive competence, where human’s perception of property rights at the time of
defining them were incomplete. What does this mean? The property rights structure for the
clean air and water public goods was not fully understood at the time energy institutions came
into existence. So when electric utilities began to belch various types of emissions into the air, it
was not considered an illegal infringement on individual property rights until people began to
understand costs related to the externalities. Although Alfred Pigou wrote about The Economics of
Welfare in 1920, followed by Ronald Coase’s work on “The Problem of Social Cost” in 1960, the
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issues they discussed with regard to the socially optimal outcome of agents harming other agents
were not addressed at the legislative level for the environment until clean air legislation was
introduced to congress during the 1970s. Major issues about externality costs, social welfare, and
property rights for clean air and water became commonly understood knowledge with the
passage of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments (FWPCAA) in 1972, and the Clean Water Act (CWA) amendments in 1977. By
this time, however, modern society had grown to revolve around the production of cheap,
centralized electricity, presenting law-makers with the dilemma of maintaining the balance
between stability and sustainable growth. More specifically, the dilemma was how to provide
electricity for the masses, while ensuring the electricity providers that have enabled growth
would not hinder future sustainability through debilitating negative externalities. The
government took the route that, at the time, was the most rational option. Electricity is a
strategic resource thought unlikely to be provided adequately by unregulated markets. However,
this was the government’s bounded rationality, prohibiting them from seeing better policy
options such as liberalizing markets, capping emissions, and auctioning tradable permits that
allow the free market to find efficiencies. Perhaps at the time, technological limitations that
created the government’s bounded rationality were not close to being adequate enough to allow
for a decentralized energy infrastructure to enable the growth that the United States has seen
under a centralized energy infrastructure. Hence, the quandary between which is more
important: rapid growth or sustainable growth.
The reader should certainly not understand these statements to imply that all
government intervention in the free market is bad for the economy because this is not the case.
Politics play a huge role in the determination of economic activity because of the inseparable
relationship that it shares with institutions. “Together they determine the ability of countries to
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accumulate, to innovate, to adopt new technologies, and to reorganize in the face of
technological change. And they shape the economic policies that either promote or hinder
growth.”lxxxv It is the government’s role to establish clearly, well-defined property rights so that
the institutions and markets that form will follow incentives for beneficial societal evolution
towards natural equilibrium. Policies that do otherwise are potentially harmful to the free market
economy because they hinder the market’s ability to find its natural equilibrium. Natural
equilibrium being where marginal social cost is as close as possible to private costs so that there
are minimal externalities, and that these costs equal marginal social benefit. It is government that
spurs the development of the institutions which,
…affect the incentives to innovate and to develop new technologies, the
incentives to reorganize production and distribution in order to exploit new
opportunities, and the incentives to accumulate physical and human capital. For
these reasons institutions are more fundamental determinants of economic
growth than R&D or capital accumulation, human or physical.lxxxvi
Government intervention was needed in the case of electric utility holding company mergers in
the early 1900s because it is likely that monopolies may have taken advantage of consumers.
Government, because of its bounded rationality, supported a specific type of technology
(centralized energy). Had other measures been taken, such as restrictions on emissions and
inefficiencies, micropower may have prevailed as the popular institution or at least encouraged
more R&D in decentralized energy technologies. Other measures that created incentives to
reorganize production and distribution from centralized to decentralized may have sparked
electricity’s transition from being a top

down supply driven strategic resource to a bottom

up demand driven commodity.
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Introduction____________________________________
As Oliver Williamson noted in his article “The New Institutional Economics: Taking
Stock and Looking Ahead”, “[an] attribute of human actors warrants remark, and that is the
capacity for conscious foresight.”lxxxvii Institutional change in the energy industry would be
beneficial for job creation, economic growth, and sustainability. Re-defined property rights are
necessary for this to be achieved to create the incentive structures for capital to flow towards
new and developing technologies. Allowing further perpetuation of centralized energy
distributional coalitions will prove to be detrimental to society. Williamson quotes Richard
Dawkins on the future of societal change in lieu of limited cognitive competence, saying that it is
the “capacity to simulate the future in imagination… [that saves] us from the worst
consequences of the blind replicators.”lxxxviii Hopefully, through insights brought to light in this
paper, the reader’s conscious foresight and capacity to simulate the future through the
imagination might help save us from the worst consequences of allowing existing centralized
energy distributional coalitions to live on without competition from decentralized energy. Future
policies should alternatively promote change in the industry to a distributed energy generation
based system by the incentives of redefined property rights for public goods. In Chapter Five I
will explore what institutional change in the energy industry would entail by first discussing the
flaw in the incentive structure allowing for centralized energy to exist, then explaining how
capitalism is still working in favor of decentralized energy despite market barriers. Then,
referencing theory in Chapter Two, I will explain how the transition to decentralized energy will
cause large-scale economic growth and institutional change without sacrificing short term
stability. In Chapter Six I conclude this thesis with my policy prescriptions based on the
theoretical model for reshaping the entire market by redefining property rights for public goods
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and creating a government backed organization to solve the collective action problem that
prohibits the people from adequately representing themselves in defending their right to clean
air, water, and naturally occurring climate in a court of law. Following, I discuss how this
conclusion may not be feasible and what other policy prescriptions fit the model as well as have
a chance for success in the real world.

lxxxvii
lxxxviii

Williamson 601
Ibid. 601
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5_______________________________
Institutional Change in the Energy Industry
Rare windows of opportunity to effect broad reform are thereby opened.
Such “defining moments” are nevertheless the exception rather than the
rule. At least partly because of our primitive understanding, the response
to such opportunities is often one of “failure”. Absent such a window,
major changes in the rules of the game occur on the order of decades or
centuries.
(Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking
Stock, and Looking Ahead)

Despite high market entry barriers, decentralized and renewable energy popularity is
gaining momentum amongst many businesses and governments for reasons related to market
opportunity and environmental responsibility. Big oil firms BP and Shell are spending billions of
dollars on developing businesses to take advantage of future alternative energy markets such as
solar, wind, and hydrogen. Energy conglomerate GE has independently taken steps to cut its
CO2 emissions, as well as launch it’s “Ecomagination” theme, implying clean energy is
commercially viable. Governments in the US, Asia, Canada, and the EU are making efforts to
support renewable energy projects that will aid in the world’s growing demand for electricity and
to address the controversial topic of human induced climate change. Whether it is
environmentalism or capitalism that is driving this popularity, the players are beginning to realize
that the game is changing. Electricity demand in the United States, in particular, is expected to
continue increasing at a steady pace through the foreseeable future, where at current capacity
and price, there will be a significant shortfall of supply, consequently constricting economic
growth. Through 2020, it is projected that in order to meet the growing demand for electricity,
the United States will need anywhere between 1,300 and 1,900 new power plants, or
approximately one new power plant per week (See Appendix D). These capital intensive plants
69

Institutional Change in the Energy Industry
often take years to build, making centralized energy an inadequate solution to this inevitable
problem. Economic growth will decline and stability will be threatened unless energy institutions
begin to change. This chapter will discuss the limitations of “free” market capitalism’s creative
and destructive capacity over the centralized energy distributional coalition. Using theory
outlined in Chapter Two, it will be clear by the end of this chapter how unprecedented
economic growth will arise from leveling the energy playing field through the promotion of free
markets, with an efficiently enforced property rights structure, for the transition to decentralized
energy.

What’s Wrong With the Playing Field and How Do We Fix It?
The players in the energy game are not all on equal footing. Organizations in competitive
markets are almost always playing on a field that is unbalanced due to technological innovation,
however, the energy field is unbalanced because of government-induced forces such as subsidies,
monopoly regulation, and poorly defined property rights. The question is: should government
promote efficiencies by simply liberalizing the market, or should government tip the scale in
favor of new technologies to speed the transition with renewable and decentralized subsidies? In
answering this question, the reader must understand some of the underlying themes in this
thesis: no one individual or group of individuals can know precisely what the consumer will
demand like a free demand driven market can, and that the government should provide
protection of clearly defined property rights for public goods. There will always be barriers to
market entry for new technologies in competitive markets—the requisite for a healthy market is
natural competition where consumer demand determines technological outcomes as opposed to
government legislation. In order to ensure natural competition in the energy market,
government-induced constrictions must be curbed both in favor of centralized and decentralized
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energy technologies. Adding to North’s sports analogy, no one likes to watch a sporting event
where the referees are blatantly favoring one team, it is always best to watch the best team win.
From discussion in Chapter Two, the reader knows that individual and economic
freedoms are paths to true democracy and that societies which restrict the free market by
supporting specific technologies in order to induce economic growth are not truly democratic,
they consist of central planning. The United States, for example, will never truly be democratic
unless it eliminates market restricting subsidies and monopoly regulation in the energy arena.
These restrictions are abusing the capitalist mechanism by limiting its ability to function properly
in response to consumer demands, placing society at risk for economic decline. By the same
token, the free market can just as easily fail the consumer and the environment unless there are
clear and well-defined property rights. The rules must first be re-defined to protect public goods
to allow this market to be free flowing within the structural matrix without the threat of
exploitation. When the energy market becomes free flowing, where the playing field is level and
competitive for all rule abiding competitors, efficiencies will be found and investment will flow
toward the most promising technologies. Current incentive structures are perpetuating the
existence of inefficient technologies. Prohibiting the encroachment of public goods, specifically
the right to clean air and water, would shift incentives toward the production of cleaner, more
efficient technologies. Government should no longer support centralized energy production
because it is altering natural institutional evolution, perpetuating inefficient technologies and
hindering more efficient decentralized technologies from entering the mass market. Further
government support of the centralized energy distributional coalition will prevent critical funds
from flowing toward new decentralized energy technologies that can potentially supply the
increasing demand more efficiently. The world is ever changing and capitalism is designed to
adapt to this change based on consumer demands. Subsidies, regulation, and poorly defined
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property rights in the energy arena, however, are severely limiting capitalism’s creative and
destructive capacity to destroy old inefficient centralized energy institutions and create new
efficient decentralized energy institutions.
What should be done to fix this problem? Unfortunately, it cannot be fixed overnight
and will require delicate yet deliberate policy changes. Legislation cannot shock the entire market
by constricting current centralized energy providers from producing energy before other
decentralized providers have the capacity to supply the demand. However, the legislation needs
to be powerful enough to encourage more investment in new technologies so that future energy
demand will be satisfied before demand drastically exceeds supply capacity, hindering economic
growth. The physical problems at hand are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Producers not paying the total cost of energy production.
Public goods being taken without compensation.
Collective action problem about public goods.
Perpetuation of the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition.
Lack of investment in socially efficient decentralized energy technologies.

All of these issues must be addressed by facilitating smooth, rather than abrupt, institutional
change.

Capitalism: Battered but Not Broken
Capitalism’s creative and destructive capacity over the centralized energy distributional
coalition in the United States is severely limited. However, there are a number of factors
contributing to the push toward renewable, decentralized energy: niche markets, threat of
resource scarcity, volatile energy costs, increasing environmental awareness and activism, and
entrepreneurship.
Contributing niche markets consist of any type of energy consumer that cannot be
connected or is too expensive to connect to the grid. Centrally produced electricity is
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competitively priced with PV cells, wind turbines, gas fired micro-turbines, and perhaps even
fuel cells, in some remote locations such as country homes, highway maintenance signs, newly
erected cellular phone towers, etc. These markets are being realized by many small-cap
decentralized energy technology firms that are desperately seeking revenue wherever they can
sell their product in order to stay afloat while reducing production costs. As more niche markets
expand, firms in these markets will begin to realize economies of scale and hence reduce their
prices to levels competitive with those of primary energy markets.
The threat of fossil fuels depletion is very prevalent. The timing of depletion, however, is
a hotly debated topic. Whether these resources run out in 10 years or 100 years from now,
rapidly increasing world demand for these precious resources will ultimately deplete supplies and
drive the prices up. The threat alone is causing energy consumers and investors to hedge their
energy bets with alternative energy technologies that don’t require the use of fossil fuels. In early
2006, for example, Whole Foods Market® purchased renewable wind energy credits to offset
100% use for all its stores electricity.lxxxix Wal-Mart® has implemented renewable energy testing
at some of its facilities, utilizing PV panels and small wind turbines, hoping that the test results
will conclude reduced cost potential for many of its stores across the US.xc Colleges and
Universities are taking a lead role as well. Connecticut College and Harvard are among the many
to purchase renewable energy credits to offset their electricity demand from the grid and support
renewable energy in other places of the country where it is economically viable.xci University of
Minnesota at Morris is using electricity generated directly from a large wind turbine near the
campus.xcii Even individual homeowners are taking advantage of long term financing programs,
from companies like BP Solar and Sun Edison, which make PV paneling competitively priced
with grid electricity.xciii
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The location of different fossil fuels are not evenly allocated throughout the countries of
the world, that is to say for example regions of the world that are well endowed with reserves of
oil are not necessarily endowed with reserves of coal.xciv Meteorological, geological, geopolitical,
and political factors play into the cost of these commodities. Consumers in the United States
have not only been experiencing fluctuating prices due to some of these factors but steadily
increasing prices as well from world demand outpacing supply. Many consumers prefer to
purchase their energy from providers who guarantee prices will remain constant for a
preordained time. These providers are the owners of renewable sources of energy that take
advantage of free resources, the sun and wind.
Environmental awareness and activism has been gaining momentum as well as scientific
ground over the past few decades in response to irresponsible business operations that have
abused the environment. Businesses will exploit every possible resource available to earn a profit
even if it causes negative externalities at no fault to the competitive nature of the beast. The fault
is on the incentive structures of the institutional matrix that does not protect against this
exploitation. Increasing awareness and activism has improved the stock of common cognitive
competence about the environment as well as long term sustainability for business. Some large
corporations are addressing their sustainability by taking steps such as purchasing renewable
decentralized energy to reduce their ecological footprint, creating demand for technologies that
are more expensive than centralized sources of power.
Finally, entrepreneurship is the best example of what makes the free market so great.
Free and private enterprise that begins with an individual idea for a product and grows into a
technological innovation can change the way society works. People are constantly looking to
find more efficient ways to do just about everything, not only so that they can reduce transaction
costs but to make money. Entrepreneurship is the drive that leads to the innovation of
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disruptive technologies like the steam engine, automobile, electricity, personal computer,
internet, etc. The prospect of being the person to either invent or commercialize the next big
disruptive technology is very alluring and is the reason why as long as there is money to be made
from innovation, capitalism, no matter how battered, is not broken.

Make Way for Large-Scale Growth and
Institutional Change, Worry Not about Stability
If the playing field were transformed from a supply driven market to a democratic
demand driven market, by enabling adaptive efficiency, there would be a greater chance for
disruptive energy technologies to replace existing technologies and subsequently spur large-scale
economic growth. Society’s adaptive efficiency will determine the pace at which organizations
respond to technological change. Helpman indicates, “the ability of a country to grow…
depends on its ability to accommodate such changes, and the ability to accommodate change
depends in turn on a country’s economic and political institutions.”xcv Rules will need to be
changed in order to induce this technological shift and institutions will need to adapt in order for
society to accommodate the change.
As discussed in Chapter Two, economic growth is positively correlated with a society’s
TFP, or increasing efficiency of utilizing inputs. TFP will dramatically increase, if technological
change is allowed, by making the transition to decentralized energy where fewer inputs will be
required to generate a greater output. Economic growth caused by the reorganization of energy
institutions in the United States could potentially be as big as or larger than growth caused by
previous science based disruptive technologies. It is possible that the next milestone on the
timeline of economic growth will be the technological shift from centralized to decentralized
energy technologies. The efficiency of coal fired, natural gas, or nuclear power plants may be
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greater than that of some current individual decentralized technologies like PV paneling,
however, this is a myopic way of analyzing efficiency. The energy lost in transmission, waste of
fossil fuel inputs, and hidden costs to society caused by pollution and other negative
externalities, are a few of the system inefficiencies that are often overlooked, which cost the system a
great deal of money. A widespread use of decentralized technology would solve many of these
system inefficiency problems, thus reducing production and transaction costs, both up front and
hidden. The system will then experience large-scale growth, as discussed in Chapter Two,
because the increased system efficiencies will cause the growth curve to become steeper. The
marginal economic growth that society is currently experiencing is being caused by the tail end
of centralized energy sustaining technologies whose supply will soon be outpaced by increasing
demand.
The barriers to market entry are too high at current energy prices to support widespread
institutional change. In order for disruptive decentralized energy technologies to break down all
barriers to market entry society must improve its adaptive efficiency, which will allow for
institutional change to occur. The barriers to entry explained in Chapter Four are what North
would call a bottleneck that society must resolve so that growth is not stifled. This bottleneck is
due to organizational path dependence, which North explains is difficult to alter.
The difficulty of fundamentally altering paths is evident and suggests that the
learning process by which we arrive at today’s institutions constrains future
choices. It is more than simply that the organizations brought into existence by
the existing institutional matrix owe their survival and well-being to that matrix
and therefore will attempt to prevent changes that would adversely affect their
well-being. It is also that the belief system underlying the institutional matrix will
deter radical change.xcvi
Improved adaptive efficiency will help society to diverge from its current centralized energy path
dependence. How can society improve it’s adaptive efficiency? Adaptive efficiency is comprised
of a few primary elements: the institutional framework or rules that shape an economy by
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providing incentives, the willingness of society to undertake change through acquiring
knowledge from innovation, undertaking risk, encouraging creativity, and a willingness to resolve
bottlenecks. The United States’ adaptive efficiency, which is limited by a very large distributional
centralized energy coalition, will not improve unless the incentives provided by the institutional
structure are changed to level the energy playing field. As Helpman indicated, if society’s
economic and political institutions cannot accommodate such changes presented by
technological innovation the country’s economy will have a difficult time growing. The current
institutional framework has been conducive to the growth of centralized energy, consequently
leading to the development of an outdated technological distributional coalition. A restructuring
of the rules to protect property rights of public goods would give the market incentives to
improve adaptive efficiency, causing organizations to change their business models in favor of
natural competition based on the learning by doing and the development of tacit knowledge for
improved technologies. This would ultimately cause the economy to experience large-scale
growth due to disruptive energy technologies commercialized through natural market forces.
This natural evolutionary growth of the economy caused by the maximum generation of free
flowing market trials is more sustainable than rapid growth caused by specific governmentinduced incentives for specific technologies because in a world of uncertainty, no one individual
knows the answer to the problems we face.
Polities need not worry about the threat of creating instability by changing the
fundamental rules of the game. Short-term stability will remain if proper steps are taken to
induce the transition, however, this goal becomes insignificant if the system is not sustainable in
the long run. The growth and stability that the United States has been able to experience due to
government regulated centralized energy since the early 1900s is irrefutable. However, because
the institution has slowed down society’s decision making process, erected entry barriers for new
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disruptive technologies, required complex legal and regulatory frameworks, complicated the role
of government, and damaged capitalism’s ability to bring new technologies to market in a time
when demand is outpacing supply capacity, it has crippled the economy’s adaptive efficiency and
thus it’s ability to grow. As Huntington indicated, stability is vital but change is not necessarily
harmful to society. Change that comes from natural economic growth in particular is in fact
good for the survival of regimes, where a lack of change resulting in a decline in per capita
income is detrimental to survival. Natural economic growth is usually a gradual process,
indicating that once large-scale growth is experienced from a new disruptive technology, society
will develop sustaining technologies and become economically and institutionally stable once
institutional change has taken place. Therefore, with the daunting task of providing a nation with
enough energy capacity to satisfy its ever-increasing demand at hand, polities need not worry
about short-term stability but instead shift gears and start thinking about long-term
sustainability. Further support of centralized energy could threaten sustainability because the rate
of growth of income per capita will decline if the rising costs of energy and the negative
externalities caused in its production continue to take money out of people’s pockets.

A Glimpse of the Future
Taking giant steps without being able to see where one is going is a daunting and risky
endeavor. Therefore it is no wonder why one might be skeptical about the alleged improvements
in societal welfare spoken about in this paper after the proposed drastic institutional change has
occurred. What would a society look like after such a transition? Perhaps something seemingly
out of a futuristic science fiction novel, however, the future is upon us.
Prince Edward Island (PEI) rests off the eastern coast of Canada. Its economy imports
nearly everything that it consumes, including the resources to generate energy. Wishing to relieve
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itself from costly imported energy, the PEI Energy Corporation partnered with Canadian fuel
cell maker Hydrogenics to evaluate the PEI energy system and come up with a more efficient
solution. The island’s most abundant natural resource is wind, so naturally the energy companies
decided to use this green resource for electricity production. What they came up with is a wind
to hydrogen village energy system. Wind farms at the northern most tip of the island generate
electricity that feeds the grid and is used to electrolyze water into hydrogen and oxygen.xcvii The
oxygen is sold as a commercial gas and the hydrogen is stored and shipped to local automotive
refueling stations for fuel cell or internal combustion powered cars. Since wind is an intermittent
power supply and cannot supply uninterruptible power, the hydrogen can also be used to store
the wind’s energy for use by fuel cells in micro-energy markets. This energy restructuring relieves
PEI’s dependence on foreign energy sources and creates jobs in the restructuring process.
Money is kept on the island as opposed to sending it offshore for energy, freeing up capital for
economic growth and thus increasing wealth. Using hydrogen, as opposed to fossil fuels, as a
primary energy carrier is beneficial to the environment. Overall, societal welfare is improved as a
result of restructuring PEI’s energy system.
This is just one case where the ideas brought to life in this thesis are actually being
implemented today. In the future the grid will exist only for the purpose of trading energy on
micro-levels. High tension power lines that mar the landscape will no longer exist because
centralized energy providers will no longer be the least costly provider of energy. The most
centralized energy providers of the future will be wind farms. Wind farms are renewable energy
providers that will generate the electricity necessary to electrolyze water into hydrogen and
oxygen, which are clean storage mediums for energy. The hydrogen generated by the wind farms
will be shipped to local refueling stations for fuel cell powered Hypercarsxcviii. The hypercar
concept is an ultra-light hybrid vehicle that weighs two to three times less than conventional
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steel cars, has ultra-low drag, and is powered by efficient hybrid electric systems that require
much less power than that of steel vehicles because of weight savings. “Since the average car is
parked 96 percent of the time…” a hypercar that runs on a hydrogen fuel cell could be plugged
into an intelligent Hydrogen Energy Web (HEW) “…during non-use hours, to the home, office,
or main interactive electricity network, providing premium electricity back to the grid”xcix turning
the car into a zero harmful emissions micro-power plant on wheels.
If just a small percentage of drivers used their vehicles as power plants to sell
energy back to the grid, most of the power plants in the country would be
eliminated altogether. This is because a hydrogen-fuel-cell-powered
transportation fleet of 200 million vehicles has four times the generating capacity
of the entire national power grid.c
During the transition period from today’s conventional automobiles to hypercars, PV paneling
can provide intermittent power when energy from the hypercar supplied HEW is unavailable.
Real-time energy meters can account for personal energy usage to the micro-second, and
whether energy is produced by the consumer or by the a micro-network, the meter would charge
the user whatever the current rate relative to the cost to produce the power, providing incentives
for conservation.
This type of decentralized supply driven market for electricity frees up capital for
economic growth. Economic development in the form of job creation will be in the wind, solar,
fuel cell, information technology, and micro-energy trading industries. No dollars will be
exported for energy resources that are currently purchased from politically unstable regions of
the planet. Keeping dollars at home, as is happening in the PEI case, increases wealth, and
provides a path toward environmental improvement. An entirely decentralized, renewable
energy system such as this will have a dramatically reduced environmental impact relative to the
current centralized, fossil fuel based system. With virtually no emissions, the negative externality
cost of the old system are dramatically reduced. The threat of human induced global warming is
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reduced because of the reduction of green house gas emissions. There will be improved air
quality because of a reduction of nitrous oxides and other gasses contributing to urban smog.
There will also be an improvement in water quality because of a reduction of sulfur emissions
that are known to cause acid rain. Not only does this new system improve our own
environment, it also has a huge positive impact on the global environment. Down stream issues
related to long range transboundary air and water pollution are reduced as a result of this
improvement. Increased demand for green energy technologies in the developed world will drive
the price of these technologies down, potentially enabling technology spillover into developing
countries due to price competitiveness. A reorganization of energy institutions in the developing
world may solve an overwhelming number of problems that face the world today, improving
global societal welfare.
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Policy Recommendations
…a private enterprise system cannot function properly unless property
rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to
use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so
does the government except that a legal system to define property rights and
to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary.”
(Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission)

Ideas raised by Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960) in their works on welfare and social costs
did not have a significant impact on environmental legislation until the 1970s. Common place
perception of property was not as fully developed as it is today at the time when centralized
fossil fuel based energy began to emerge as the nation’s dominant electricity provider. Yet the
United States still does not have a clearly-defined, well-specified set of property rights with
regards to public goods (air, water, climate, etc.). Until these rights are established, organizations
will continue to alter the institutional landscape by negatively exploiting property belonging to
the public, causing markets to ultimately fail.
The development of well-specified property rights… will make the overall
environment more predictable but will increase uncertainty for those who
traditionally have used the land in question without having formal title. Hence an
essential question we must ask is, who makes the rules and for whom and what
are their objectives? There is no necessary identification between institutions and
efficiency as economists use (and misuse) the term. Indeed one of the major
puzzles to be explained is how, and under what conditions, humans create the
conditions necessary that make for markets with low costs of transacting and
increase material well-being.ci
Those who have been using these public goods without title and their investors will be forced to
invest in cleaner technologies, resources, and lesser cost solutions for generating energy. I
propose that the government establish these rules via Constitutional Amendment specifying to
whom these goods belong, for the purpose of promoting efficiency and sustainability. The
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objective is to create the incentives for new institutions to emerge that make markets work more
efficiently and reduce transaction costs, thus improving societal welfare. The energy market is
not free because reliable access to energy has for so long been perceived to be a natural
monopoly that government has an obligation to provide, which is consequently carried out by
the support of centralized energy. Market barriers are hindering emerging technologies from
becoming competitively priced in this environment. Removing these barriers will change the
incentive structure, garnering new developments in renewable, alternative, and decentralized
energy technologies that are more efficient than current technologies, thereby altering the
institutional framework and encouraging large-scale growth. Scholars such as Robert Stavins and
Howard Geller have suggested a series of policy recommendations to remove these market
barriers, however, none to my knowledge thus far mention amending the Constitution or
creating a new government funded organization to represent the people’s goods as I have
suggested based on this model. Following a discussion of the logic and reasoning behind this
proposed solution, I explain why it may not work and explore more realistic solutions that also
fit the model.

Constitutional Amendment and a
New Player in the Game
The United States celebrates July 4th to commemorate the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. In that document, Thomas Jefferson wrote that citizens of the United States
have the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” said unalienable rights. This idea
was taken from John Locke, who actually wrote of the right to life, liberty, and estate. Jefferson
had replaced “estate” (or property) with “the pursuit of happiness” because he thought property
was too closely tied to feudalism, which could potentially be diverging from the idea of liberty.cii
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Not discrediting Jefferson’s inclusion of “the pursuit of happiness,” but perhaps he should have
not manipulated John Locke’s insight. Locke’s idea of property is very important in the creation
of markets, which modern economies are based around. Public goods that are shared by us all
are the people’s forgotten property and are not mentioned in all of the Declaration of
Independence, original Constitution, Bill of Rights, or subsequent amendments to the
Constitution. Why? When economic agents are able to use goods whose title is not defined in
any of the country’s primary institutional documents, how can anyone expect the outcome to be
sustainable? The unalienable rights Jefferson noted should read: life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness, and the legal protection of public goods and private property.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, reads that:
“No person shall… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This statement mentions
private property but does not mention public goods. Without mentioning public goods the
institutional framework that evolves around this restriction regarding private property will not
have any reason not to exploit public goods. Therefore, I propose an amendment be made to
the document which all must abide by in the United States that declares the existence of and
assigns title to the citizens’ public goods. The amendment, which I hope will later be critiqued
and improved upon, will look something like this:
An Amendment for the protection of the public goods belonging to the citizens:
Section I:
Amendment V of the Bill of Rights shall now include this statement after
the final line. “The public goods belonging to the citizens of the United States,
including those that are not divisible and cannot be monetarily quantified or
personally owned, such as clean air, clean water, and naturally occurring climate,
shall not be negatively infringed upon or be exploited beyond an excessive level
for public or private use by any one person or business organization without just
compensation to the citizens of the United States.”
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Section II:
The government is responsible for the creation of an agency to represent
the citizens of the United States that is entrusted with the duty to seek out and
prosecute violators of Section I, for the purpose of protecting and bringing one
unified voice to the citizens who are not unified or incapable of action against
those with superior budget and extra time to fight such matters in a court of law.
Section III:
The just compensation awarded to the citizens by court of law through
this agency shall be used solely to clean up the contaminated environment using
best available technologies and to pay for the rehabilitation of human ailments
caused by polluting agents.
Section IV:
The leadership of this agency shall be chosen via national democratic
election. All citizens eligible to vote for the President of the United States shall
be eligible to vote for the leader of this agency. The chosen leadership shall hold
no more than two terms, each term existing no more than three years.
Section V:
Section I of this amendment shall be enacted into law no more and no
less than a period of ten years after its passage for the purpose of allowing those
who would currently be violators to have sufficient time to take the appropriate
measures to be ready for the passage of this amendment into law. After this ten
year grace period, there shall be no grandfathering of any one person,
organization, or legal entity, thus prohibiting any further infringement against
public goods belonging to the citizens. Sections following Section I shall be
enacted immediately after passage for the sake of the new agency’s preparedness
when Section I is finally enacted into law.

Logic and Reasoning
Who do public goods such as the air and water belong to? Public goods belong to the
people, but the people are many and these goods are vast. Divided the people are powerless but
together they have a voice that is larger than that of the centralized, primarily fossil fuel based,
energy distributional coalition. The government, representative of the people, should be
responsible for creating an institution, or a player, that represents the interests of public goods
belonging to the people so that a presence could be made in a court of law when the people seek
reparations for property rights infringements. Public goods cannot be protected against unless
there is an incentive structure not to exploit them. Government should be responsible for
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solving this problem of collective action which is causing this market failure because it exists to
represent and act in the best interest of its people.
A Constitutional Amendment would give validity and title to the rightful owners of
public goods, making it illegal to take and use them without paying—as is the case with private
property—creating the proper incentive structure for beneficial societal evolution to take place
via free market forces. Restructuring property rights would improve society’s adaptive efficiency.
The creation of a government-backed organization, addressing the problem of the citizens’
collective action, to counter the centralized energy distributional coalition would level the playing
field in a court of law, ensuring protection of the public goods belonging to the people. This
change in property rights would be the catalyst for institutional change, as investors’ money
flows away from centralized energy sustaining technologies and toward decentralized energy
disruptive technologies. Top
transform into bottom

down centralized systems would, over the ten year grace period,

up decentralized systems that are demand driven as opposed to supply

driven, thus increasing efficiencies. Increased efficiencies, as explained in Chapter Two, will
improve social welfare and spur large-scale growth driven by disruptive energy technologies that
no longer face high market entry barriers.
Vital to the success of this new system is the specification of recipients of the funds
raised by the new organization through the courts. The funds raised could be designated for
reinvestment in the infringing organization to “self fund” R&D for more efficient energy
technologies, however, this would not create the incentives for free decision making and perhaps
cause the creation of yet another distributional coalition. The just compensation belongs to the
citizens for the purpose of fixing the problems caused by the infringement on public goods, so
that the infringer pays the real total cost of producing their product, including its negative
externality costs to society. This is why Section III designates that this compensation be solely
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put towards the clean up of the contaminated environment (such is the case with waste
discharges), and rehabilitation of human ailments caused by the polluting agents (such is the case
with respiratory ailments).
This organization is meant to be representative of the people and not be influenced by
the heavy hand of interest groups, which is why the President of the United States is not nor is
any other individual given the power to elect its leadership, as in the case of the Federal Reserve
Chairman or Supreme Court Justices. The citizens of the United States should be allowed to
vote for such a candidate in a democratic election to facilitate appropriate representation.
Naturally, this position may very well lead to the creation of various parties who promise to best
represent the people. The potential downfall of this is that parties funded by the centralized
energy distributional coalition will have superior funding to all other parties. The issue that needs
more thought, and thus not mentioned in this Amendment’s first draft, is campaign finance
restrictions, which has become a hotly-debated topic in modern politics. Logically, I leave this up
for debate as it is unclear what type of campaign finance system will best suit this situation. The
three-year term life is intended to allow sufficient time for elected leaders to seek out and
prosecute violators of Section I. The allowance of no more than two terms is intended to
promote new ideas and fresh thinking in and around the organization.
Tinkering with the institutional building blocks of an economy will cause short term
instability if appropriate counter measures are not taken. Shocking the system could prove more
detrimental than beneficial. This is the logic behind the ten-year grace period between the
passage of this amendment and the enactment of Section I into law. Arbitrary as it may seem,
the ten-year period is taken from recent history during the 1990s when it took roughly ten years
for personal computers to become mainstream means of communication, commerce, and
information. Given sufficient warning, businesses will have a definite timeline to reorganize and
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reinvest in order to be in compliance with the new law as decentralized energy technologies
become the mainstream energy providers. If there were no grace period, grandfathering would
be necessary so as to allow some cushion for the economy to sustain such a dramatic change in
investment. However, since there is a ten-year grace period, grandfathering is prohibited because
the goal is to maintain an aggressive and smooth transition for overall economic and social
benefit.

Why This Conclusion May Not Work…
Finding a Compromise
Based on the outcome from the analysis of current energy institutions through the
theoretical model, my personal recommendation is a Constitutional Amendment. However, I
also recognize that since the 1970s the government has, with the CAA (1970) and FWPCAA
(1972), attempted to solve the collective action problems caused by undefined property rights
for public goods. Solutions have allowed agents to discharge through command and control
schemes or technology based emission standards, permitting, and giving away tradable permits.
Although these efforts have not always been imposed to the best of the government’s ability,
they have in fact been used. The problem with setting very strict or zero emission standards for
all contributing agents, as per the Constitutional Amendment, is that the date for which
standards are set would likely be pushed back, if it is even technologically possible. For example,
if the ten-year grace period detailed above was not enough time for decentralized energy
technologies to supersede centralized energy, would the government bring the economy to a halt
by telling companies to shut down power plants? No. The new unachievable standards would be
postponed. Achievable goals must be set in order to solve the problems.
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The opportunity cost of the primary goal needs to be weighed with what is being given
up in the transition process. Where is the compromise between the conclusion drawn from the
model and reality? The physical problems previously identified must be re-identified.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Producers not paying the total cost of energy production.
Public goods being taken without compensation.
Collective action problem about public goods.
Perpetuation of the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition.
Lack of investment in socially efficient decentralized energy technologies.

The goal, than, is for legislation to address all five of these problems within the confines of the
model and reality. Harvard economist Robert Stavins identifies four categories of market
instruments to address the externality issue: tradable permits, charge systems, government
subsidy cuts, and reductions of ‘market frictions,’ which are similar to the frictions referred to in
Chapter Two.
Tradable permits are a tried and tested market approach to solving all five of these
problems:
Under a tradable permit system, an allowable overall level of pollution is
established and allocated among firms in the form of permits. Firms that keep
their emission levels below their allotted level may sell their surplus permits to
other firms or use them to offset excess emissions in other parts of their
facilities.ciii
The stringent tradable permit scheme for SO2 written into the Clean Air Act in the early 1990s
was a great success in combating acid rain. Due to differences in abatement costs among
emitters, this approach gave rise to cost savings on the level of $1 billion per year over the
1990s. In fact, industry actually cut SO2 emissions by more than the law specified.civ Some
ecologists have even argued that the cap is too low, indicating that industry could have sustained
a more stringent cap while still saving the country money. Specific approaches to emissions
permitting solve each of the five specified problems above. By setting emission caps and
auctioning off tradable permits, the ones generating energy would be forced to pay for the public
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goods that they are using as with any other resources input, raising the cost of producing their
product without any grandfathering. Tradable permits encourage decentralized decision making
that is technologically non-specific, allowing producers to either pay the cost for abatement
technologies, or purchase a permit for their emissions. Producers are then paying the real total
cost of production and the used public goods are being paid for. The government, by assuming
the right to manage the sale of public goods, solves the problem of collective action. Stringent
emission caps that dramatically increase production costs will force producers to raise the cost of
purchasing the product, making such products less price competitive and cause investment to
flow toward alternative energy technologies—solving the last two problems. Although there are
historical examples where stringent emission caps have resulted in postponing standards, the
model indicates that the investment shift may cause disruptive technologies to finally break
down the barriers to market entry. Therefore, stringent emission cap and trade programs similar
to SO2 trading in the 1990s fit the theoretical model and solve all five problems.
Green taxes are another solution to the problem of externalities that get “the prices of
goods and services to reflect their true environmental impacts… The guiding principle is that the
polluter pays for the harm that his actions contribute to the environment.”cv Taxing specific
types of fuels or emissions would solve most of the five problems and lead to conservation of
air and water usage. Producers would pay the total cost of their product and public goods would
be paid for. Perpetuation of the centralized energy distributional would depend on how high the
taxes are and how much investment actually flowed towards new technologies as a result of the
taxation. Stavins indicates that identifying an appropriate tax rate is challenging for law-makers:
“Ideally, it should be set equal to the marginal benefits of cleanup at the efficient level of
cleanup, but policy makers are more likely to think in terms of a desired level of cleanup, and
they do not know beforehand how firms will respond to a given level of taxation.”cvi Also,
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Vaitheeswaran notes that green taxes are “too often blunted by blanket exemptions granted for
heavy industry on such bogus pretenses as preserving ‘national competitiveness’….”cvii Although
green taxes have worked in situations in which a government has wanted to influence a
particular technological outcome, such as Europe’s phase-out of leaded gasoline during the
1980s, the act of taxation conflicts with the models guidelines because it targets specific
technologies.
Subsidies that attempt to get prices right “are probably the single biggest distortion of
the markets in the developed world.”cviii Subsidy reductions (or elimination) to both nuclear and
fossil fuel based players in the centralized energy industry are a step in the right direction toward
achieving these five goals because they often have a tendency to “promote economically
inefficient and environmentally unsound practices.”cix Reducing subsidies will not solve all of the
five problems but this action is necessary for fixing market matrices to foster institutional
evolution that is beneficial to society. In Chapter Two, I discussed market frictions as being an
accumulation of laws, taxes, and subsidies that are technologically specific, causing an outcome
that distorts the free-flowing nature of a market. This can potentially cause the market to clear at
an equilibrium where marginal social cost does not equal marginal social benefit because
producers are not paying the total cost of production and the playing field is not level for all law
abiding players. Technologies that may be more sustainable for economic growth would fall to
the wayside as the centrally assisted technological outcome will prevail, leading to unsustainable
rapid growth.
Stavins also refers to a reduction of market frictions as sound market-based policy
instruments to address environmental problems. The market frictions that Stavins refers to share
some similarities with those defined in Chapter Two but are in fact different:
(1) market creation for inputs/outputs associated with environmental quality…
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(2) liability rules that encourage firms to consider the potential environmental
damages of their decisions; and (3) information programs, such as energy-efficiency
product labeling requirements.cx
What Stavins cites are not actually frictions, they are policy responses to frictions that exist either
because of outdated regulations, improper utilization of public goods, or inadequate market
information. Each of these policy responses to market frictions fit the theoretical model and
solves at least one of the five problems.
The first friction reduction Stavins refers to is precisely what this thesis has been calling
for: further deregulation in the retail energy industry so that previously monopolized regions are
opened up to competition from new firms and sources of generation. Stavins notes that the
primary arguments for restructuring are:
(1) the electricity industry is no longer a natural monopoly, since small generation
technologies are now competitive with large centralized production; (2)
consumers will benefit from buying cheaper electricity from more efficient
producers, who currently face significant barriers to entry; and (3) the old system
with cost-of-service pricing provides poor incentives for utilities to reduce costs
(Brennan et al. 1996).cxi
As deregulation occurs, new markets are created for more efficient decentralized energy
producers that drive prices down and are beneficial for the environment.
Stavins’ second response to market frictions, liability rules, provides “strong incentives
for firms to consider the potential environmental damages of their decisions. In theory, a liability
rule can be cost effective as a policy instrument, because technologies or practices are not
specified.”cxii Liability rules fit perfectly into the model because there is no technological
specificity. These rules, however, are generally more effective in the case of hazardous waste
spills and are the primary founding mechanism for the Superfund program. Liability rules may
not be effective in the case of air pollution because one agent’s emissions that disperse into the
atmosphere are not easily seen as in cases of hazardous waste spills, making the polluter
unidentifiable.
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Stavins’ third response to market frictions is an attempt to create textbook style perfectly
competitive markets. “Since well-functioning markets depend, in part, on the existence of wellinformed producers and consumers, information programs can—in theory—help foster marketoriented solutions to environmental problems.”cxiii Increased corporate transparency by means of
product labeling would give consumers the ability to see how socially responsible companies are
that produce the products they purchase. The EnergyStar label for example indicates that a
product such as an air conditioner or refrigerator is efficient. Another type of information
program is a reporting requirement. Whether the producer is required to inform the government
or the consumer about its production practices and products, the increased transparency allows
the consumer to make better informed choices about their consumption.
In conclusion, instead of suggesting an unrealistic policy such is the Constitutional
Amendment calling for zero emissions, I compromise between the theoretical model and reality
by suggesting a mix of policies. Aside from charge systems, or green taxes, each of the marketbased policies that Stavins outlines fits the model and to some degree solves the major problems
identified above. Auctioning tradable discharge permits forces producers to pay the total cost of
production, compensates for public good usage, solves the collective action problem, and raises
costs for the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition making other energy
producers more competitive, thus giving investors an incentive to move funds toward socially
efficient decentralized energy technology R&D. As stated in the model, the more stringent the
permitting, the more incentive there is for investment in disruptive technologies that can lead to
large-scale growth and an improvement in societal welfare. Permits that expire after a period of
time allow the government to re-auction the same amount or fewer rights to use public goods.
By re-auctioning fewer permits, the market price of usage will be higher. This can be a helpful
mechanism for the government to control the rate at which energy prices rise and other
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technologies to become competitive, or in other words, facilitate a smooth transition.
Technology spillover that may occur as a result of decentralized energy technologies becoming
price competitive could also help solve global emissions problems. I also support the reduction
of frictions as referred to in Chapter Two—such as technologically specific taxes, subsidies, and
legislation—that cause markets to clear at an equilibrium where marginal social cost does not
equal marginal social benefit. This will correct inherent flaws in the markets themselves by
leveling the playing field, allowing for free-flowing market transactions to decide which
technologies are best for sustainable economic growth. Finally, I also support the policies that
Stavins suggests in response to what he calls market frictions that exist either because of
outdated regulations, improper utilization of public goods, or inadequate market information.
Further deregulation in the retail energy industry will foster the development of new markets for
decentralized energy producers, creating new places for investment as well as competition for
centralized energy. Liability rules hold the wrongdoers accountable for their actions and are not
technologically specific. Holding high accountability standards forces companies to put serious
thought into their operations and forces them to be more risk averse when operations could
potentially harm the environment. These rules, as previously stated, may not work in the case of
air pollution. Information programs improve the flow of perfect information, a problem that all
markets have, thus improving overall market efficiency. The model tells us that solving these
problems will improve societal welfare by encouraging decentralized energy to replace
centralized energy and cause large-scale, sustainable economic growth. Based on the restrictions
of the theoretical model and reality, a combination of these policies should solve the five
specified problems, thus achieving the primary goal.
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Areas for Further Research
After outlining the theoretical model and analyzing centralized and decentralized energy
institutions, four other particular areas stand out that deserve further research. First, similar in its
centralized nature, an analysis of centralized oil institutions should be conducted through this
theoretical model. Oil is a finite resource, whose derivatives provide the energy necessary for the
majority of the world’s transportation. It is also a fossil fuel that is primarily centralized in
volatile parts of the globe. As this thesis suggested, the transition from centralized to
decentralized electricity generation would improve societal welfare, perhaps the theory would
also suggest the same for a transition from a petroleum-based economy to a hydrogen-based
economy. Second, further research should be conducted to find the actual dollar amount of the
hidden negative externality costs associated with the combustion of fossil fuels. The goal of this
research should be to find whether the costs are higher than benefits. Third, an analysis should
be conducted on the economic benefits of a hydrogen-based economy. If the US made the
transition to a hydrogen-based economy and became independent of foreign sources of energy:
no more money would be going overseas for oil, dollars would be re-spent at home, and
potentially less money would be spent on health costs associated with the pollution caused by
fossil fuel combustion (this amount depending on the outcome of the second study I proposed).
Finally, if the US made the transition to decentralized energy, would there be decentralized
energy technology spill-over into developing countries? If there were, would this benefit the
developing worlds where centralized energy has failed? Would our own leadership in solving
problems at home be the solution to international public good degradation and eliminate the
need for international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol?
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